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ABSTRACT
After decades of centralization and government control, port infrastructure development and
provision of services in Mexico are being transferred to the private sector. As the country prepares to
enter the 21st century, port infrastructure will play a key role in strengthening and diversifying
Mexico's international trade. The commitment to port improvement should remain strong despite
currently weak economic conditions: construction, management, financial, political, institutional and
legal issues should be adeptly addressed to improve port performance. The process of privatization of
the Mexican port system is considered from these several perspectives. Since this process is of
national and international significance, the experience of other countries in port infrastructure and
privatization is used as a base for international comparisons.
Worldwide, ports are quickly strengthening their role as strategic gateways for foreign trade.
Ports continue to evolve as technology transfer facilitators, and can play an extremely important role
supporting countries' economic development and reaching equitable distribution of growth. Those
countries not able to trade effectively in today global economy endanger their economic prospects
and are likely to suffer reductions in their range of industrial activities. In the coming era, abundance
of natural resources is no longer a determinant factor for competitiveness. Advancing technology in
ports and in shipping, along with increasing operational and modal integration, are introducing radical
changes in port industry.
The private sector faces a tremendous challenge to improve the Mexican port system's
competitiveness, given the context of increasing maritime internationalization and technological
change. The complexity of the needed transformation is notable. The goal of this thesis is to consider
how the variables involved in the privatization process and trends of port international activity can
affect its success. Port privatization goals in Mexico must be extended beyond the system's
economic, financial and management consolidation. The approach should be strategic if the Mexican
port system is to be competitively positioned for the future. Infrastructure redevelopment strategic
actions are proposed to achieve this goal.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Adequate infrastructure is a critical factor for economic diversification, expansion of
trade and productivity enhancement. During the past seven years, the Mexican government has
changed its infrastructure development and services provision policies. Private sector
involvement has experienced continuous growth, as a key feature of the Mexican program of
modernization. The commitment to privatization in Mexico has assumed considerable
prominence, but at the same time it has raised fundamental questions about the proper role of the
government, and the proper definition of private sector responsibilities to respond to the diverse
interests and needs of the Mexican society. Adding complexity to this issue, Infrastructure
privatization in Mexico is being carried out in an adverse macroeconomic environment, after
years of apparent stability. Therefore, several new issues emerge and need to be resolved in
Mexico if new programs to privatize infrastructure are not to face severe reversals. All of these
issues require analysis of this process from different, but interrelated, perspectives. Former
privatization efforts in Mexico have left important lessons.
Port infrastructure development and provision of port services is one of the recently
started privatization programs in the country. The program deals with a Mexican port system
which exhibits absence of competition and, and above all, construction and technological delays
are characteristics. Decades of centralization and government control prevented the consolidation
of workforce, fixed infrastructure, equipment and development of cutting edge technology and
port management skills. Trade diversification is urgently needed in Mexico in an era in which
abundance of natural resources is no longer a determinant factor for gaining competitiveness.
Revitalization of our port system is a priority. National port development should
effectively respond to the trends of international maritime activity, since changes in technology
have affected the structure of the world's port industry. Bigger ships, advanced information
technology systems, and increasing efficiency of cargo handling and ocean and inland
transportation services are main changes that have affected the market power of ports,
significantly raising competition among terminals. All these issues call into question traditional
port policies based on state control. Focus on port performance raises new questions about the
strategies of port administrations to provide services.
The critical role that the Mexican ports will play as strategic gateways, foreign trade
channels and technology transfer facilitators can provide the strongly required momentum in
Mexico to support, sustainable economic development and equitable distribution of growth. Port
management and concessionaires have to address the problems of the Mexican port system from
a wider perspective, if sound competitiveness is to be built. The first step is to understand the
evolution of the port system in Mexico over time and identify the issues that have made the ports
in Mexico non competitive. Resolving these issues provide the base for the future. To succeed, it
is necessary to understand the proper function of the ports in Mexico and their economic,
technological effects and options for their improvement. The alternative to improving
management and operations has been to privatize the system, strongly impacting the national port
institutional structure, organization and procedures.
Therefore, it is necessary to establish a framework to analyze the context and scale of port
privatization in Mexico, including economic, legal, regulatory, management, operations, and
construction issues. It has to be considered that given the current instability of the Mexican
economy, a great challenge is to design a sustainable strategy for attracting both, domestic and
foreign investment. Then, the potential of the process of transfering port activities to the private
sector to correct the managerial vices can be evaluated. However, it is clear that the government
is to play key role as ports are redeveloped in Mexico. Besides creating adequate links between
port improvement and national development, the Mexican government faces the challenge of
assuming an effective position as director of the national port strategy. Thus, the redefinition of
the role of the government must also be considered.
If port privatization in Mexico is only analyzed from its own domestic viewpoint,
improvement of the port system will be performed from a narrow perspective: It is necessary to
take advantage of former lessons learned from port systems' transference in other countries.
Only in this way it will be perceived that the objectives of port privatization in Mexico are
broader than in other countries and can have more transcendent effects. In the present work, all
the mentioned issues are analyzed and recommendations are made regarding each aspect. In
addition, the port privatization experiences of other countries are related to the Mexican case, by
means of international comparisons.
International changes in port environment have to be assessed, since the evolving forces
of sea transportation and global competition are demanding countries make constant
improvements in maritime infrastructure. Ports are going to experience continuous and radical
changes worldwide, due to the advancements in port and shipping technologies and operations. It
is imperative that Mexican ports reach the same rate of transformation to compete in a
sustainable way internationally. From this stems the requirement of a different port privatization
approach in the country. Strategic objectives and a framework of strategic actions are proposed in
this thesis to address these issues of change, and the critical role of containerization and
intermodal transportation as channels of technology transfer and development is discussed.
The present thesis includes a case study of the implementation of the Mexican port
privatization program, exemplified by the concession of the specialized container terminal at the
port of Veracruz. This provides the opportunity to evaluate more specifically the privatization
scheme itself, the bidding process, contractual agreements, valuation of assets, financial issues,
risks and the role of Mexican constructors and foreign companies in forming strategic joint
ventures. Recommendations on container operations and management are made. The study
concludes positioning the Mexican ports and their management in the future, within the
international maritime activity.
CHAPTER 2 MEXICAN PORT SYSTEM ANTECEDENTS AND BACKGROUND
2.1 COASTAL AND PORT DEVELOPMENT
2.1.1 EVOLUTION OF PORTS IN MEXICO
The objective of this section is to identify long term historical issues that have affected
port infrastructure and services in Mexico throughout time. This will permit an understanding of
the deeply established cultural and planning aspects that have raised the need for a change in port
development perspective, now being carried out by means of the privatization effort.
Currently and historically, none of the major cities of Mexico has been a port, despite the
fact that the country has approximately 10,000 km of shores'. Since colonial times, main
population settlements were located at the central zones and high plateau. The port of Veracruz,
as the commercial exit to Europe, was the only point on the east coast that had maritime
importance. Historically, it has been under strong governmental control. The mining centers
attracted most of the people to the center of the country and control over territory was centralized
at Mexico City. The colonial government reserved for itself all the administrative activities and
infrastructure development initiatives.2 The strategic-centralized provision of infrastructure,
characteristic of the monarchies of Spain and France, was strongly inherited by their colonies,
whereby their first independent governments adopted the same policy. Those governments did
not have administrative experience and were not able to implement planning schemes according
Puertos Mexicanos, "Oportunidades de inversion en la privatizacion de los puertos Mexicanos. " Puertos
Mexicanos, 1993; p. 2; Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "Puertos: La Frontera
Olvidada", Febrero 1987; p. 7
2 Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "Una Historia Mediterranea", Febrero 1987; pp. 20-
21
to the particular needs of their countries, specifically the need for integrated territorial
development. The administrative centralization was strengthened by the several invasions that
Mexico suffered during the postcolonial period. Since the threats coming from the sea were
constant, the ports acquired extreme strategic importance for national security, and therefore their
control was strictly reserved by the government3 .
The location of the main commercial activities at the center of the country and the
centralized supply of maritime infrastructure and services are tendencies that have remained until
recent times. When Mexican foreign commerce began to be mainly directed northward to the
United States, the wide border between the two countries stimulated road transportation and
caused maritime commerce with Europe to decrease drastically. At that time, foreign
transportation companies began to take control over maritime trade in Mexico. Progressively,
growth of the oil industry transferred resources and motivated the economic development of the
southeast coastal zones and prompted the growth of some port cities. The final outcome has
been a weak commercial maritime infrastructure in contrast with strong oil ports facilities (where
only oil derived products are handled). The purpose of this work is to analyze the process of
privatization and redevelopment of the commercial ports. Government's Petroleos Mexicanos
will continue controlling the oil maritime terminals. The oil based Mexican development plan led
to the creation of the oil and Industrial ports programs, which aimed to attract to the coastal
zones those industries able to use the nearby available oil resources in their production
3 Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "Una Historia Mediterranea", Febrero 1987; pp. 20-
21
processes.4 However, this was not enough to stimulate an integrated and even coastal growth in
Mexico. In addition, all the activities: infrastructure construction, dredging, maritime
signalization, equipment supply and operation, remained under governmental control s. The lack
of incentives to constantly improve the ports' performance neutralized the potential benefits of
the intensive construction of infrastructure at the industrial and oil ports. Another relevant issue
to mention is the wrong governmental perspective of coastal development as just related to port
development, ending with the consequent general lack of maritime trade culture of the population
in these zones6 .
The Mexican ports infrastructure development throughout time had been negligible until
the 1950's when the industrialization process started7. This period represented the main stage of
ports infrastructure construction. During that time, rationalization of the terminals' existent
infrastructure and construction of new ports, mainly using them as exit for exports of agricultural
products, motivated the development of three of the most important ports on the Pacific:
Ensenada, Guaymas and Mazatlan. In addition, the infrastructure of the ports of Manzanillo,
Salina Cruz, Tampico, Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos were improved and international traffic,
destined for Mexico, but handled by foreign ports, began to be attracted to Mexican terminals.
The next decade uncovered the deficiencies of the system: lags and obstacles raised by
mismanagement, as a result of lack of administrative and organizational flexibility. Inadequate
4 Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "Los Puertos Industriales Mexicanos", Enero 1982;
pp. 38-43Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "El Sistema Portuario Nacional", Enero 1982; p. 11
Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "El Desarrollo Costero en Mexico", Febrero 1987;
?.9
References to this topic can be found in: Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "El Sistema
Portuario Nacional", Enero 1987; pp. 9-27
maintenance also played an important role, causing performance delays. Over this time, the
equipment was not modernized, and reached the limits of its capacity, lagging behind the new
needs that emerged as technical innovations were developed in maritime transportation. The lack
of training programs for port workers also represented a critical issue that caused an increase of
work risks and suboptimal cargo handling. In the 70's, the port administration's response to the
growing oil industry was the Oil and Industrial Ports Program. Results of the program were the
ports of Laizaro Cirdenas in the state of Michoacfn, El Osti6n in the state of Veracruz and
Altamira in Tamaulipas. The latter currently plays an extremely important role within the system.
In the 1980- 1990 decade, the government improved the infrastructure of the main industrial and
oil ports and began to introduce equipment and infrastructure for operating containers. Due to the
intensive capital investments needed, the programs were not able to catch up with current port
technology and changing national economic conditions made those efforts more difficult.
Topolobampo in Sinaloa is an outcome of this stage. The schemes of the 1980's strongly relied
on the government's Fondeport, a trust for the development of industrial ports, marinas and
experimental industrial fishing ports.
2.1.2 PLANNING PERSPECTIVE: A PROBLEM OF CONSISTENCY AND
INTEGRATION
The issues involved in coastal development are varied and complex, and therefore,
adequate planning acquires critical importance . Port development in Mexico has not been the
result of continued actions, consistent with the growth of the country, although the federal
8 Personal Interview, Ing. Hector Lopez Gutierrez; December 1995
centralization that dominated the system over time was in a certain way a good opportunity for
implementing a national strategy. Port infrastructure services were undertaken out of a business
framework, and limited to fulfill budgetary requirements without regard to profits9. The latter
caused allocation of subsidies without restraint, a key reason for the failure of ports operations in
Mexico, where profitability has never been the aim. The centralized administration of all of the
terminals, plus excessive governmental financial support, did not allow competitiveness to
emerge.
The planning inconsistencies that were present as time passed, did not permit the
development of required technological mass. Given this context, it has been very difficult to
establish sustained support for adequate programming and planning'0 . Even more difficult have
been to perform these activities under regional integration. In the same way, the lack of expertise
in coastal management did not permitted the establishment of hierarchical system sets or identify
priorities. The economic growth of the country in its central region caused the country's
communications to heavily rely on roads. Port systems not only are a link with road, rail and ship
transportation but also represent a link between two types of trade. Planning inconsistency in
ports was linked to investment inconsistency. The outcome was unevenness in transport capacity
and incompatibility among rail, railroad and port systems. Port problematic in Mexico implies a
process of growth transfer among different industrial zones". The same can be stated about
managerial skills, which are less developed regarding maritime activities. A summary of the
9 Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "El Desarrollo Costero en Mexico", Febrero 1987,
p. 9-15
Personal Interview, Ing. Hector Lopez Gutierrez; December 1995
1 Colegio de Ingenieros Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "El Desarrollo Costero en Mexico", Febrero 1987,
pp. 9-15
identified problems, which represented throughout time serious obstacles for the progress of the
ports system, and has motivated the current change in perspective towards privatization, follows:
* Deep centralization
-Political inconsistency and lack of strategic planning.
-Absence of competitiveness among ports and coastal regions.
* Government absolute control, which caused:
-Lack of managerial independence and absence of incentives for improvement and
efficiency.
-Lack of accountability and transparency of information.
-Port activities have not always been developed following the logic sequence: Planning -
organization - regulation - implementation.
-Technological delays which have been derived from hindrance of initiative.
* Construction of infrastructure, dredging, operation and equipment supply were inefficient and
bureaucratic, by lack of meaningful competition.
* Uneven development of rail, road and port systems.
* Lack of integration of coastal regions.
2.2 EVOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF PORTS IN
MEXICO 12
12 References to the evolution of the port federal agencies in Mexico can be found in: Colegio de Ingenieros
Civiles de Mexico, Ingenieria Civil, "El Sistema Portuario Mexicano"; Enero 1982, pp. 9-35
Though federal centralized, the public administration of ports had always been
fragmented in several agencies. The planning result was a sequence of independent programs
which did not bring into focus the system's concerns. The federal agencies in charge of port
activities carried out their functions without continuity and coordination among themselves.
Bureaucratization and managerial vices led to inefficiency, high cost of operations, and steadily
increasing allocation of federal subsidies. The impacts on the national industry, the share of
international trade movements, and on governmental expenditure have been significant.
Before 1970, the ports were managed by the Secretaria de Marina (Navy) which
performed port development with a narrow focus. The involvement of other governmental
agencies in ports activities divided the authority over the ports into eight agencies. In the late
60's, the control over the system was totally transferred to the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y
Transportes (SCT, Ministry of Transportation). In 1973 the SCT created the Comision Nacional
Coordinadora de Puertos (CNCP, Ports National Coordination Commission). This government
agency would coordinate port activities and services. At each of the important ports a public
enterprise of ports services was created, which were also coordinated by the CNCP. This allowed
users to know the specific services available at each port. The effort did not stimulate
decentralization. The most important task of the CNCP was the planning of port development.
The CNCP began to realize the needs of integrated port planning and increasing articulation with
other transportation modes. The government was the provider of services, and the labor unions
and users participated with the CNCP in the elaboration of the regulatory structure. The
construction of infrastructure remained under the control of the recently created Subsecretaria de
Puertos y Marina Mercante (Underministry of Ports and Shipping). This agency was integrated
by the divisions of maritime works, dredging, maritime signalization and the Direccion General
de Operacion Portuaria (General Direction of Operations), whose objectives were consolidation
of authority and productivity enhancement. In 1984, after the issuance of the Mexican
modernization program of State Owned Enterprises (SOE), The Secretaria de Comunicaciones y
Transportes proceeded to divest some of the port related agencies with the intention of
rationalizing the sector. Among these agencies were the Coordinacion General del Programa de
Puertos Industriales (Industrial Ports Program Commission) and the Fideicomiso para
equipamiento maritimo y portuario (Trust for maritime equipment), which after their creation,
just substracted from the CNCP functions and responsibilities. This caused overlapping of
authority.
The need of consolidating in a single agency the control of port activities, including
maritime construction and dredging, persisted until 198913. In addition, a unifying criteria for the
management of the different kind of ports was required. The creation of the agency Puertos
Mexicanos in 1989 and the divestment of the CNCP, permitted to the federal government the
concentration in a single agency of the policy definition and planning tasks. Besides this, Puertos
Mexicanos would also undertake the construction of maritime and ports Infrastructure, dredging
and operation of services. The organization chart of Puertos Mexicanos and its position under the
SCT organization are shown in figure 2.1. and 2.2 (Source 13). The Issuance of specifications and
standards for maritime construction, equipment supply and acquisition approvals were also
" SCT, Puertos Mexicanos: Manual de Organizacion: Antecedentes, Mexico 1992, p. 4
responsibility of Puertos Mexicanos. Among other functions, the agency has been in charge of
the followingl 4:
* Control of Statistics and information on infrastructure and operations. Evaluation of port
activities performance.
* Provision of the wide range of port services and control over their business units.
* Management, use of infrastructure and issuance of permissions and evaluation of
concessions.
* Evaluation of the financial and fiscal position of the SOEs providers of ports services
* Negotiation of international agreements
* Motivation and promotion of the private sector participation in port activities.
* Leading the privatization program and perform all institutional, structural, regulatory and
legal required changes.
14 SCT, Puertos Mexicanos: Manual de Organizacion: Atribuciones, Mexico 1992, pp. 7-29
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2.3 COMPARISON WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE U.S.
PORTS'5
The U.S. ports suffered a transition from private to public enterprises. The system in the
U.S. has been looked as essentially national16, playing a strategic position in national defense.
Some issues such as monopolic practices, railroad's divided interest in serving competing ports,
the need to promote new trade and a lack of coordinated port development, caused social
dissatisfaction. The latter drove the shift towards public administration. The goal was to ensure
free and equitable access to all waterfront users. The transition to public control resulted in the
creation of numerous port authorities. Most of these agencies have independent authority and
their actions are not controlled by external entities. This has stimulated effective management of
ports out of large legislative and regulatory bureaucratic machines. Then, the authorities have
been more capable to adapt themselves to changes of maritime technology and trade.
Contradictory relationships with other public agencies have been minimized. The incentives for
innovation have been preserved and so technically competent staff. The ports authorities perform
their business plans without constant involvement or constant supervision from the central
government. However, the U.S. ports experience increasing problems in financing operations.
Ports are currently planning expansions without having the financial ability to undertake the
projects, increasing subsidization needs. The lack of national port policy does not allow accurate
identification of needed infrastructure expansion, and local needs are being prioritized over
national interests. Furthermore, environmental restrictions and dredging bureaucratization and
1sSee M. Ircha: "U.S. Ports, Evolution and Structure", Maritime Policy and Management, Vol 22 No. 4, 1995;
p. 80-93
Personal interview, Dr. Ernst Frankel, MIT.
increasing regulatory predisposition are causing delays to port development and management
programs.
2.4 CURRENT STATUS OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE AND CARGO MOVEMENT
IN THE MEXICAN PORT SYSTEM' 7
The system is integrated by ports and maritime works as follows:
* 22 ports of commercial importance, managed by Puertos Mexicanos. These ports handled 29
million of tons in 1993. Four ports are considered to have national importance: Manzanillo,
Lazaro Cardenas, Veracruz and Altamira. The rest have regional importance
* 18 oil specialized terminals, managed by Petroleos Mexicanos, which together handled 121
million of tons in 1993
* 20 marinas and touristic port facilities
* 34 small fishing ports, managed and operated at local level
* Several maritime facilities operated by companies with unique expertise in handling
aggregates and mineral products in the national industry
Although the 94 ports have docking facilities, the core of the system is considered to be
integrated by 73 ports, with a total dock length of 110 km. Of this length, 45% is located on the
17 The infromation related to this section was compiled from the following references: Puertos Mexicanos,
Catastro portuario, Mexico 1991; SCT. "Programa Nacional de Modernizacion de la Infraestructura del
Transporte", Mexico 1992, pp. 42-46; Puertos Mexicanos, "Oportunidades de Inversion en la privatizacion de los
puertos Mexicanos." Puertos Mexicanos, 1993, pp. 2-6; SCT "Oportunidades de Inversion en Infraestructura
Basica en Mexico" SCT 1993, pp. 5-20.
Pacific coast and 55% belongs to Gulf and Caribbean ports. The system also counts with 2.6
million of square meters of cargo storage facilities and 113000 meters of maritime protection
works.
In 1993 the system moved approximately a total volume of 180 million of tons, 73% was
international traffic and 27% was cabotage traffic. Of the total volume, 67% corresponded to the
oil and oil derived products handled by Petroleos Mexicanos, and 17% to mineral products,
mainly limestone aggregates and other non processed minerals moved by private companies at
their own terminals. The 22 commercial ports dependent on Puertos Mexicanos gathered the
remaining 16%. This percentage, which accounted 29 millions of tons was integrated by
agricultural products, fluids, bulk cargo and containerized cargo. Figure 2.3 presents the
percentages by kind of cargo handled by the system in 1993 (Source 1).
Geographic location of the port system is shown in figure 2.4. The Mexican port activity
is heavily concentrated in the 4 most important ports, Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas on the
Pacific shore, and Altamira and Veracruz on the Gulf coast. They moved together more than the
68% of the volume traded by the 22 commercial ports (see figure 2.5, source '). This is a natural
outcome because of their close location to the main urban centers and industrial points of the
country. The region of influence of those 4 ports cover 55% of the national population and 80%
of the industrial activity of the country. In addition they have a superior level of infrastructure
and high relative productivity compared to other national ports.
Regarding the evolution of the types of cargo handled, the main growth tendencies are
registered in the movement of containers. Volume was doubled from 1989 to 1993, with an
annual growth of 21%. However, the movement of containers just reached 470000 TEU's
(Twenty feet equivalent unit, twenty feet container), a figure that is very low and not
representative of the level of industrialization of the country. I state this considering the strong
road trade between the United states and Mexico. Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of container
traffic in Mexico (Source 1). Conditions are different in the cruise market. Currently, Mexico has
the 2nd world position of received passengers, only below the combined totals of the Caribbean
islands ports.
According to the SCT, the modernization and expansion of the port system requires in the
short term an investment of approximately 770 million of dollars, to be completed before the
year 2000. A high proportion of this figure will be concentrated on the ports of Manzanillo,
Altamira, Veracruz and Lazaro Cardenas, which will require 560 million of dollars'8 . Other 5
ports of relevance, Puerto Madero, Cozumel, Progreso, Ensenada and Topolobampo require
investments worth at least 210 million. These investments are to be directed to three specific
kinds of projects:
* Construction and upgrading of basic port infrastructure
* Projects of reconstruction of major specialized terminals and storing facilities
* Construction and improvement of port utilities
18 SCT. "Programa Nacional de Modernizacion de la Infraestructura del Transporte", Mexico 1992, p. 44
Figure 2.3 CARGO HANDLED BY THE MEXICAN PORT SYSTEM
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Dredging and maritime protection are required at the ports of Ensenada, Cabo San Lucas,
Topolobampo, Salina Cruz, Altamira, Tampico, Tuxpan and Frontera. Other investments are
required by the system for infrastructure maintenance and failure prevention, such as the
rehabilitation of facilities at the ports of Guaymas, Mazatlan, Salina Cruz, Tuxpan and
Coatzacoalcos. The characteristics of the system generate important opportunities for
maintenance and development of maritime infrastructure in the country. The high concentration
of port activities that exist in Mexico represents in the short term an opportunity for
concentrating efforts and upgrading the infrastructure and services of the 4 main ports towards
international standards.
YEAR
Figure 2.5 Cargo movement in the main commercial ports in
1993 : 29 million of tons
Tampico -
Altamira
Others 14%
31%/ Manzanillo
12%
Lazaro Cardenas veracruz
22% 21%
Figure 2.6 MEXICO: CONTAINERS TRAFFIC EVOLUTION
500 /
450
400-1
b 350
I-
u. 3000
250
Z
' 200
0 150I-
100
50
0-A
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 191
Figure 2.6 MEXICO: CONTAINERS 
TRAFFIC EVOLUTION
93
CHAPTER 3 THE MEXICAN PORT PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
3.1 LIBERALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF PORT SERVICES
3.1.1 WORLD TRENDS
Ports that have not recently been upgraded and modified are suffering under the impact of
technological developments in ocean and inland transportation: bigger ships, evolution of cargo
handling methods, operational and transport modal integration, and a decreasing control of the
public sector over maritime infrastructure services worldwide19. Ports will play an increasing role
as links among multimodal transport services. New port management systems are being
developed. Economies of scale in shipping are acquiring strong proportions20 . Container and
connection inland depots are in use now. Information technology and communications systems
are changing quickly. More specialized cargo handling equipment is constantly being developed.
These advances in ports and shipping have caused these activities to be so capital intensive that
consolidation of operations and management is needed to perform rapid changes. These
conditions require increased ability to direct large financial resources in the short term,
something that private entities rather than governments can achieve 21. For world port systems,
1985 marks the startup of privatization22 . Some cases have been successful experiences, all
participants received the expected benefits. In other cases, the results have been mixed, strongly
dependent on the way liberalization and privatization schemes were implemented. In those
19 Frankel, Ernst, "Debt equity conversion and port privatization" Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 19
No. 3 1992; p 201
2°Comtois, Claude "The evolution of Containerization in East Asia" Maritime Policy and Management Vol. 21
No. 3 1994; pp. 195-205
21 Personal Interview, Dr. Ernst Frankel, MIT
n B.J. Thomas "Privatization of the U.K. Seaports" Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 21 No. 2 1994, pp.135-148
instances, privatization was used for transferring ownership or liabilities, but not control. Ports
were kept under strict regulation and operational constraints. Speaking worldwide, the level of
privatization of ports is still behind that of other sectors of transportation which in turn lags
behind privatization in other economic sectors worldwide and particularly in developing
countries 23. Governments are understanding that this must change because national port
effectiveness determines competitiveness in international trade. Currently, ports are one of the
most capital intensive sectors of the transport industry and governments can not afford to
aditionally burden their budgets with these enormous investments. There is a need to accelerate
privatization and liberalization of ports, particularly in developing countries, if they are to
improve their rates of development and a more equitable distribution of growth.
3.1.2 PRIVATIZATION OF PORTS: CONTEXT AND SCALE
The methods of equity or assets transfer must be carefully evaluated during the planning
stage of port privatization, otherwise irreversible disadvantages will arise24. In the same way,
privatization of maritime infrastructure involves long term commitments which must be
considered when determining the possible extent of privatization. Ports have local and national
economic and political impacts. The transfer complexity of port infrastructure and services is
high. The driving forces of privatization of port systems are to reduce government size, improve
productivity and eliminate subsidies. Effective privatization has to be coordinated with greater
23 Personal Interview, Dr. Ernst Frankel, MITU Vuylsteke, Charles "Techniques of Privatization of State Owned Enterprises" World Bank Publications, 1988;
pp. 109-116
liberalization in terms of government deregulation and control retreat.25 When a government
decides to implement a port privatization program, it first has to evaluate its objectives and needs
in order to make privatization attractive, meaningful and equitable for itself, society and the
private investor. The critical issue is to effectively match the government objectives with the
national maritime concerns. Political influences and interest group policies, such as granting
excessive privileges to labor unions should be avoided to the greatest extent 26. They are
undesirable as they weaken momentum of change. Equity impacts on the different sectors can
raise questions on how much to privatize, which port business units can be privatized, to what
extent this is possible, and how this should be done.
In addition, careful assessment of the price to be paid for tangible and intangible assets,
such as potential strategic value of the port, is necessary. The fairness of the price will be heavily
dependent on the conditions of the macroeconomic environment. If a recession is being
experienced, then cost reimbursement is seldom achievable, because undervaluation is practiced
in order to attract investors under risky conditions. Undervaluation is also likely to occur when
the government is leaving the port with liabilities. This is often the case of debt/equity swaps in
port privatization, where total equity is often transferred for payment of the debt, which may be a
small fraction of the value of the equity of assets27. Effects on employment and related costs of
workforce rationalization should also be measured, as state owned ports tend to be overmanned.
25 Ian Thymnne - Mohamed Ariff "Privatization: Singapore's experience in perspective" Longman, 1989; p. 55
26 Vuylsteke, Charles "Techniques of Privatization of State Owned Enterprises" World Bank Publications, 1988;
pp. 69-70
27 Frankel, Ernst "Debt Equity Conversion and Port Privatization" Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 19
No. 3 1992; pp. 201-209
Ports are not labor intensive but labor extensive. Practically unmanned ports are a reality today in
South Asia and the Netherlands28.
Ports are regulated and controlled in several ways:
* Economic regulation: tariffs and charges for services, fees on ships and cargo traffic, and
duties
* Operational regulation: service frequency and methods, employment and work rules, safety,
environmental impact, routing and scheduling, inspection and monitoring; and
* Management control including ownership.
While these measures can play a role in worker and environmental safety assurance, most
economic and management controls affect operational decisions and are a major cause for low
levels of productivity, efficiency, service quality and market responsiveness. Port privatization
preceded by liberalization ensures that new owners will have sufficient freedom to innovate and
compete effectively29. Privatization should only be attempted if liberalization permits conversion
of port services into competitive enterprises. Level of Ownership issues have an extremely
important role. The levels of effort and skills employed by the new management have a direct
relationship to the degree of ownership.
A difficult issue is the financing of port privatization. Ports have a well defined physical
infrastructure, but their outputs and boundaries among services and markets are more difficult to
2 Cargo Systems journal, December 1995; "Automation"
29 Personal Interview, Dr. Ernst Frankel, MIT
define30 . Special attention must be given to the valuation of risks, opportunities and threats. If
there exist debts or claims against the port, the complexity increases. The existence and access to
capital markets, equity swaps and other methods of financing also affect the cost of privatization
financing.
In summary, to ready a public port for privatizing requires31:
* An enterprise analysis which includes status and market evaluation
* Study of the legal requirements and conversion to the most effective legal form. This is
strongly linked to modifications of the legal framework
* Financial restructuring
* Operational and managerial transformation
* Methods of transfer of personnel and workforce rationalization prearrangements
* Market reevaluation
* Debt consolidation; and
* Reassessment of financial conditions and records of performance
However, deferring privatization of non profitable ports can lead to higher costs by
keeping them. Pre-privatization restructuring may make part or all of the port an attractive
investment. To consider all these issues carefully will increase the possibilities for successful
program implementation.
3oVuylsteke, Charles "Techniques of Privatization of State Owned Enterprises" World Bank Publications, 1988; p
67
31 Based on : Vuylsteke, Charles "Techniques of Privatization of State Owned Enterprises" World Bank
Publications, 1988; pp. 94-108
3.2 PORT PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM IN MEXICO: IMPLEMENTATION
3.2.1 THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE API CONCEPT
Until the year of 1995, Puertos Mexicanos was the federal agency in charge of port
administration, infrastructure operation and construction, dredging, and maritime signalization.
Puertos Mexicanos was the provider of the full range of port services32. In 1996, each one of the
main ports will have its individual administrative agency. Now, the APIs, or Administraciones
Portuarias Integrales are constituted as corporate entities, and will assume the responsibility for
the administration, planning, port promotion and port infrastructure development, within a
framework of managerial and operational independence 33. The creation of these agencies is the
backbone of the new port law and the entire privatization program. It is important to note that
the existing fixed infrastructure, ground and waterfront, which constitute each port will remain as
federal property. Their use, management, operation and construction have been transferred to the
APIs under the agreement called "Partial Concession of Rights". The APIs are to operate the
terminals and facilities by contracting third private sector entities under competitive bidding,
according to the port law34. Concessions will include financing, construction and operation of
terminals when new facilities are required. In this way, the private sector will be the direct
operator of terminals and facilities by means of concessions derived from the API's Partial
concession of rights, which is awarded by the federal government. These APIs' new endowments
are established in the APIs concession title and in the port law. The government body of each
API is the board of directors. In this first stage of corporatization, the board is overseen by the
32 SCT, Puertos Mexicanos: Manual de Organizacion: Antecedentes, Mexico 1992, p. 9-2933H. Congreso de la Union, "Ley de Puertos" 1993, Articulos 38-43
34H. Congreso de la Union, "Ley de Puertos" 1993, Articulos 20-37
Ministry of Transportation, and has members from the state and local governments, financial
institutions and the local private sector35. The organizational structure of the APIs, is shown in
figure 3.1 (source 36) will change as the privatization process advances and the private sector
takes full control over operation of infrastructure and provision of services, as it is discussed in
the following section.
A federal port agency, the Coordinacion general de Puertos (CGP) is to assume the role of
the government in port activity", and it is dependent on the SCT (Ministry of Transportation).
The CGP is to Lead, plan and direct the implementation of port policies, direct project general
infrastructure development, and design the national competitiveness strategy by coordinating the
different APIs in an interactive context. Furthermore, security for the participants in the projects
will be granted through the actions of this agency. The CGP will also deal with international
issues and consolidate port information in Mexico.
Regarding port strategic development, each port will have a Master Infrastructure and
Coastal Development Program to be elaborated every five years by its APIs and approved by the
port federal agency and the ministry of transportation. It has to identify the uses and ways of
operation of the different port zones, beginning by assessing the current port conditions and
defining the zones to be concessioned. The program includes38:
35 Puertos Mexicanos "Oportunidades de Inversion en la Privatizacion de los Puertos Mexicanos" Puertos
Mexicanos 1993; p. 15
36 ICA "Privatizacion de Puertos", ICA 1995
37 H. Congreso de la Union, "Ley de Puertos" 1993, Articulo 16
38 Administracion Portuaria Integral de Veracruz "Programa Maestro de Desarrollo", APIVER 1995
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* Port growth and development projections for the future and construction
* Upgrading of facilities
* Equipment acquisition
* Maintenance requirements to be undertaken during the period; and
* Productivity minimum goals
The Master Development Program aims to ensure efficient exploitation of the port and its
rational future development. In this way, the Master Program of each port intends to match the
national strategy of the federal government, bringing into focus individual concerns towards the
national benefit.
The APIs must fulfill the CGP's and SCT requirements on infrastructure usage,
investment plans and other measures aimed at efficient port exploitation when designing the
Master development plan. However, according to the port law, the APIs have the right to propose
modifications to the Port Master Program and negotiate their approval with the Federal
Government.
Enforcement at the port will be a task of the port navy office39. Functions such as customs
and immigration will remain under federal control. In order to provide an organizational liaison
device between these federal agencies, the APIs and the private operators, an Operations
Committee will be created at each port. This mechanism will facilitate relationships among
government agencies, APIs, private concessionaires and users. The APIs will formulate the rules
39 H. Congreso de la Union, "Ley de Puertos" 1993, Articulo 17
for its port operation which are to be submitted to each Operations Committee for approval. This
committee can make recommendations on several port issues, such as operations and port
scheduling, modifications to the Master Development Program, assigning wharving positions,
tariff evaluation and client services40 .
In the same way, a Consulting commission at each port will make recommendations
related to port promotion and rational growth, and will constantly assess port impacts on the
economy of the zone. To deal with urban planning and environmental concerns, which could
affect port functions are also its undertakings41. figure 3.2 shows the new model of institutional
organization (source 42).
3.2.2 PORT ADMINISTRATION PRIVATIZATION SCHEME
The creation of APIs in each port as corporate entities will subject port administration and
management to commercial laws. However, corporatized APIs is just the first step in running
ports under business principles. Port administration could also be an opportunity of private
investment within the new port organizational structure. As previously mentioned, the APIs in
the beginning will be governed by a board of directors chaired by a person appointed by the
Ministry of Transportation. In addition to this chair, representatives from the state and local
governments, financial institutions and private sector will participate. In the initial phase, the
40 Puertos Mexicanos "Oportunidades de Inversion en la Privatizacion de los Puertos Mexicanos" Puertos
Mexicanos 1993; p. 13
41 Puertos Mexicanos "Oportunidades de Inversion en la Privatizacion de los Puertos Mexicanos" Puertos
Mexicanos 1993; p. 14
42 Comercio Exterior, Abril 1995; p. 66
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share capital of the APIs will be held by the federal government. In the second phase, once the
APIS are financially consolidated, shares will be sold under competitive public offering. It is
important to note that even in the first phase, the APIs will remain independent from the federal
government in all aspects concerning port administration and management as stated in the port
law. Therefore, the private sector will have progressive participation in port administration as
shareholders of the API corporations. Figure 3.3 illustrates APIs constitution (Source 43). During
the selling process, the APIs will have to consider that transactions will raise substantial amounts
of revenues. The possible substantial expenses involved in necessary fees and commissions to
investment banking firms and other intermediaries must be assessed. The capital structure of the
APIs will be variable. Regarding participation of foreign investment (Table 3.1), the API shares
are marketed internationally. The port law allows only a 49% of foreign participation on API
shares. Conversely, Mexican private capital participation is open to 100% 44. The possibilities for
foreign investment are different in provision of services and operation of infrastructure, where
foreign investors can hold 100% of the capital. However, in doing so, they need to establish an
enterprise entity recognized by Mexican laws. An advantage in the privatization scheme of port
administration in Mexico, is that widespread shareholding is permitted, thus allowing the broader
resources of the general investors to be well targeted with openness and transparency. For these
reasons, the sales of APIs' shares seem politically suitable and will enhance market confidence,
because the private sector will acquire the capital of financially self sufficient agencies.
43 Puertos Mexicanos "Oportunidades de Inversion en la Privatizacion de los Puertos Mexicanos" Puertos
Mexicanos 1993; p. 16
4 SCT "Oportunidades de Inversion en Infraestructura Basica en Mexico" SCT 1993, p. 11.
FIGURE 3.3: CONSTITUTION OF THE APIS
CORPORATIZATION - PRIVATIZATION
CONSOLIDATION OF
COMPANIES
SALE OF SHARES
TABLE 3.1
MEXICO: PRIVATIZATION OF PORTS
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
LEVELS ALLOWED
APIs
TERMINALS
FACILITIES
SERVICES
49%
100%
100%
100%
FIRST PHASE
CORPORATIZED
GOVERNMENT CAPITAL
MANAGERIAL
AUTONOMY
FINANCIAL MANAGMENT
AUTONOMY
SECOND PHASE
PRIVATIZATION
OF
CAPITAL
3.2.3 PRIVATIZATION OF PORT SERVICES
Port infrastructure comprises all fixed facilities and structures destined to port services
provision. In Mexico, it is considered federal property45. Existing infrastructure can be leased and
new constructed infrastructure owned and then transferred. Concession of port services offer
wide range of investment opportunities with high potential of profitability, whereas market forces
and competititon will improve their production and delivery. According to the new port law,
concessions on services will only be awarded to companies created under Mexican laws, and by
public international bidding. These companies can be backed by 100% foreign investment.
Competitive bidding for the right of supplying the market can be open even by request of
interested investors, according to the business units in which they plan to compete (see figure
3.4, source 47). Therefore, the private sector through the APIs will have the opportunity and
incentive to propose port infrastructure development according to their expertise. The federal
government's CGP will in turn assess the extent to which the private propositions fit with the
national strategy.
The evaluation criteria for awarding concessions will take into account both, financial and
technical proposals46. The law states that the APIs' will provide port services through third
private parties, using exisiting infrastructure. Then, the APIs will award concessions on services
45 H. Congreso de la Union, "Ley de Puertos" 1993, Articulo 15
46 API Veracruz, API Altamira, API Lazaro Cardenas, API Manzanillo, "Concurso Internacional para la
concesion de terminales especializadas de contenedores y usos multiples", Febrero 1995
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to the private sector for their provision by an agreed period and revenue collection. Evaluation
criteria is structured as follows:
* Net present value of the financial poposal of the private firm, based on a defined time of
concession
* Sustained technical, administrative and operational capacity
* Business and investment plans
* Future development program
During a phase of growth consolidation of Mexican ports, existing infrastructure will be
concessioned through leasing and operation and management contracts. The key feature of the
concessions is that private opertors will assume all commercial, operational and investment
risks47. The concessionarie will suffer direct financial impacts if it fails to exploit port terminals
in an efficient manner and to ensure effective management. What is intended in this phase, is to
reach full capcity on the use of existing facilities for provision of services.
The financial aspects of the transference of activities to private investors are discussed, since
construction of common port infrastructure is a task of the APIs, and this mainly relies on the
revenues raised form concessionaires payment. The APIs sources of funds will be48:
* Concession upfront payment.
47 ICA "Privatizacion de Puertos", ICA 1995
48 Administracion Portuaria Integral de Veracruz "Programa Maestro de Desarrollo", APIVER 1995
* Fixed revenue collected from the Operation and Management Concessions.
* Variable revenues, based on sharing percentages on outstanding concessionaires earnings.
* Payments collected from sold equipment.
* Tariffs for use of port infrastructure.
* Government loans when required.
Construction of Infrastructure carried out by operators or concessionaires will be allowed
and will be considered their property during the concession period if it is developed in small
scale. Afterwards, all new fixed facilities will be transferred without cost to the federal
government and concessionned again through the APIs, to the same or new investors.
3.2.4 THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK. COMPETITION POLICY
To ensure healthy development of this privatization process and effective roles
redefinition, a sound port law was needed. By means of establishing mechanisms that enable
itself to be strictly respected, the port law is to provide an actualized and sound legal framework
according to the development of the Mexican ports, assuring security for the private investor. The
new Mexican port law, issued in November of 1994, considers these aspects by recognizing total
decentralization of the port administration, aiming financial, managerial and operational
independence. The law also includes regulatory modifications that will support transparency on
port operations, opening to foreign investment, a competitive environment and the incorporation
of the private sector in APIs ports administration. Figure 3.5 (Source 49) shows the legal reform in
a schematic way.
However, the Mexican port law allows the possible implementation of tariff regulation
and entry if the National Competitiveness Commission considers that to be necessary"5 . The aim
is to avoid monopolic practices. At the least, Concessionaires are permitted to request
negotiation. The National Commission of Competitiveness will turn these decisions to the APIs.
Regarding facilities constructed by concessionaires, the port law considers them as their property
during the time of concession. At the end of the concession period, constructed infrastructure will
be transferred again to public control and the API will channelize their use again.
Adequate regulation is an indispensable component of effective competition policy. As it
is the Mexican port case, liberalization has resulted in elimination of statutory barriers to
competition. Clearly, the impact of competition policy and privatization on the efficiency of
privatized ports as a highly contestable market, will depend upon how well the regulatory regime
functions. Figure 3.6 illustrates the regulatory framework (Source 47).
49 SCT "Oportunidades de Inversion en Infraestructura Basica en Mexico" SCT 1993, p. 65
50 H. Congreso de la Union, "Ley de Puertos" 1993, Articulo 60
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FIGURE 3.6: PORT SYSTEM NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
BUSINESS UNIT REGULATORY PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
DOCUMENT FOREIGN AND NATIONAL LEVEL ALLOWED
PORT ADMINISTRATION Port Law API participation
Law of foreign 49% foreign investment
Investment API in turn awards concessions
Construction
Operation
Exploitation of infrastructure
Term of concession: 50 years
VESSEL RECEPTION Port Law Corporations enacted under Mexican law:
Law of foreign j Transportation and Towage:
Investment 49% Foreign Investment
100% Foreign Investment
with permission of
Commission of foreign
Investment
Coastal Towage services:
Foreign Investment not allowed
VESSEL SERVICES: Port Law Corporations enacted under Mexican law:
NAVIGATION AID Law of foreign 49% Foreign Investment
PILOTAGE, ANCHORAGE Investment 100% Foreign Investment
LIGHTERAGE with permission of
Commission of foreign
Investment
VESSEL SERVICES: Port Law Corporations enacted under Mexican law:
WATER Law of foreign 100% Foreign Investment
COMMUNICATIONS Investment
ELECTRICITY
CARGO Port Law Corporations enacted under Mexican law:
ALL KINDS Law of foreign 100% Foreign Investment
Investment
CONSTRUCTION Port Law Corporations enacted under Mexican law:
Law of foreign 100% Foreign Investment
Investment
Restrictions Exist to foreign investment
No restrictions to foreign investment
3.2.5 PORT PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM: THE BASIC OBJECTIVES
Privatization as an institutional change is to achieve indispensable objectives within a
governmental system 51. The Mexican government expects that port institutional change will
support the modernization of the country, expand the national trade, and provide better
employment opportunities for the Mexicans 52. Port institutional changes can only achieve
temporary solutions, given the challenging international environment of sea transportation.
Although basic, the objectives of institutional change in Mexico are transcendent because they
are to provide a sound base for the redevelopment of the port system: These objectives are:
* Management and control objectives:
Reduction of the administrative machinery by means of transferring infrastructure development
responsibilities out of the public sector, with the end objective of relieving the government
budget of such financial burden as subsidies and excessive indebtedness. Raising revenues for
the government can be included in this class of objectives.
* Business Objectives:
Improvement of efficiency in enterprises which are in charge of infrastructure by means of using
the potential of private promoters and developers. This is aimed to enhance competition, and to
develop commercially oriented private enterprises and capital markets.
51 Ian Thynne - Mohamed Ariff "Privatization: Singapore's experience in perspective" Longman, 1989; p . 1052 Puertos Mexicanos, "Oportunidades de Inversion en la privatizacion de los puertos Mexicanos" Puertos
Mexicanos, 1993; p. 18
* Public Objectives
Wise implementation will result in a more efficient form of service delivery and consequently
more opportunity for a community to be productive. As a result, the initiative of people, which
has been hindered traditionally, will be progressively transformed 53.
The excessive participation of the Mexican government in sectors of the economy, seriously
obstructed in the long term the initiative of people and damaged the competitiveness of
production processes. The port industry was not an exception, thus affecting the national
dynamic. The outcome was a public administrative apparatus without the capacity to face social
national problems, foster productive investments or provide guidance to the economy. The
justification scope for adopting institutional changes towards privatization in Mexico is broader
than in other nations, due to the complexity of the problem. Its fulfillment or failure can cause
stronger implications in the national welfare than in other countries. In order to support this
statement, an international comparison is presented showing privatization targets in Singapore
and the UK. Afterwards, the international comparison is made to port privatization programs in
other countries.
53References to the topic can be found in: Vuylsteke, Charles "Techniques of Privatization of State Owned
Enterprises" World Bank Publications, 1988; pp. 57-63 Ian Thynne - Mohamed Ariff "Privatization: Singapore's
experience in perspective" Longman, 1989; pp. 11-14; World Development Report 1994: "Infrastructure for
Development" Oxford University Press 1994; p. 2; Vickers and Yarrows "Privatization in Britain" Oxford
University Press, 1988; pp. 212-213
3.3 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
3.3.1 PRIVATIZATION OBJECTIVES IN SINGAPORE AND THE UK
3.3.1.1 SINGAPORE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM5 4
In Singapore, during the 40 years before 1985, the government expanded its range of
activities, so its public policies covered most economic components. Its organizational structure
and productive processes became complex. In order to relate this issue to the significance of
privatization, I would like to mention several points: Most of the socioeconomic development of
Singapore had been undertaken by the government. Slow economic growth, massive
unemployment and inadequate education demanded the intervention of the government in order
to build an economic base, as also had done in Mexico. In the case of Singapore, the government
was successful in entering areas normally reserved to the private sector. Its success was due to
the business and commercial approaches adopted under the guidance of the Statutory Boards. So,
in Singapore the concept of State Owned Enterprise was indeed applied.
As a result, the government assumed a strategic role in strengthening the domestic market
forces and directing the international ones in a way that would benefit the national economic
interest. In spite of the success of publicly based economic decisions, Singapore began to
experiment with a privatization process strongly influenced by the world trends. Because
Singapore was able to use market forces as means of carrying out its national strategies, it
54 See Ian Thynne - Mohamed Ariff "Privatization: Singapore's experience in perspective" Longman, 1989
succeeded in consolidating competitiveness. When the economic situation in Singapore was
evaluated by the Divesting Committee, it was said that business improvement did not need to be
included in the main privatization objectives. Instead, this government appointed committee
considered the following:
* To withdraw from commercial activities, which no longer needed to be undertaken by the
public sector
* To reduce competition between the government and the private sector
* To strengthen the private sector in Singapore by allowing it to take the initiatives in the
search and use of new investment opportunities.
One additional issue should be noted: Singapore's private sector complained about unfair
competition and the need to develop its own creativity, no matter how well the SOEs were
performing.
3.3.1.2 PRIVATIZATION OBJECTIVES IN THE UK PROGRAMss
On the contrary, the UK started its program as a result of suboptimal performance of the
public industries and also intendung to reduce the size of the public sector. The power acquired
by some groups such as the trade unions and the borrowing scale of the government needed to be
reduced. Share ownership and distribution goals played a crucial role in shaping the program.
The reasons stated for privatization were diverse, but I would like to focus on one issue.
Profitability was not the objective of the government since most of the public companies were
55 Analysis based on: Vickers and Yarrows "Privatization in Britain" Oxford University Press, 1988
profitable before privatization, but it was the potential to improve their performance. The first
step was to improve the management of businesses. As in other countries, government
intervention restricted the extent of commercial activities. The UK government was committed to
create an enterprise culture, motivate managers to be responsible, accountable and more
responsive to changes in the marketplace. Privatization also established a structure that
strengthened the capital markets. In this way, the pressures that private investors imposed over
management would improve efficiency. This was particularly relevant in sectors which were
subject to intense competition like ports.
In conclusion, the implications of the success of privatization efforts in these countries
were not as crucial as they than are now for Mexico. Singapore learned to use competition and to
harness the market forces long before privatizing. The UK SOEs were not in a financially
disastrous position. Its program has been successful and relatively smooth, ending in lessons that
motivated other countries to do the same. The UK case showed the enormous potential of
privatizing SOEs. In Mexico, infrastructure providers are now learning to be marketable,
efficient and competitive. The learning process will not be easy, but the outcome will be
decisive, as to the competitiveness of the Mexican Ports in the world economy.
3.3.2 INTERNATIONAL PORT PRIVATIZATION: COMPARISONS WITH THE
CASE OF MEXICO
3.3.2.1 THE CHILEAN PORTS CASE56
The modifications performed in 1981 to the Chilean port agency (EMPORCHI), along
with legal, and operational changes, established the basis for the actual Chilean port model. The
performance level of Chilean ports compared to ports in Latin America, showed innefficiency in
operations, characterized by cargo loading and unloading congestion, vessels time losses, cargo
handling insecurity and institutional bureaucracy. The main problem of Chilean ports before the
implementation of the changes, similar to Mexico, was concentration of port control in a single
institutional entity. This model has been unable to respond to the needs of improvement of Latin
American maritime activities.
The issues presented in Chile confirm the fact that a single port federal agency controlling
all port activities can not gain operative efficiency and at the same time direct adequate level of
attention to the concerns of each port. The same occured in Mexico. In Chile, liberalization of the
economy through export pressures acted as mechanism that forced institutional changes, which in
turn allowed investments to pervade the port system. Legal changes permited the establishment
of competition for operating port terminals, through the administration of EMPORCHI as
corporate entity. On the other hand, Mexico's different corporate entities have been created at
each port to best pursue the local interest and promote coastal growth and industial development
56 Comparison based on the information of : "Evolucion y Perspectivas en la Institucionalidad de los Puertos
Chilenos" Empresa Portuaria de Chile, Noviembre 1994; pp. 11-16
transfer to each port' zone of influence. In Chile, competition for provision of services and the
implementation of an effective tariff system permited infrastructure usage to be optimized. The
Mexican case shares some characteristics with the Chilean program such as legal changes
opening private foreign investment and creation of a new federal agency in charge of the
implementation of regulation and macroeconomic policies for the port industry (Chilean National
Port Authority). In addition, the Chilean program decentralized power through the creation of
state and local authorities. These changes not only have given a solid base to the development of
port industry in Chile but also increased expansion pressures over its system.
Chile has become conscious of the need of being adaptable to the changes in the
international port environment. Its position has been to be ahead, planning upfront. The
geographic characteristics of Chile have positioned the country as the main gate for the
introduction of maritime cargo from the Pacific to South America. Therefore, the time
permanenece of most of the cargo in the Chilean ports is minimal. Besides this, the sustained
growth of the economy, as opposed to the case of Mexico, has prepared the ground for the
Chilean ports to reach the competitiveness needed by the Pacific Rim Trade.
The results of port administrative and legal changes towards liberalization and allowance
of private investment in Chile, has been impressive increments of cargo tonnage handled and full
port international opening: Diversification of trade through port imporvement allowed Chile to
fastly change its commercial profile. In 1991, Japan occupied for first time the position of main
trade partner of Chile, instead of the United States. Trade with the other Southasian countries has
also increased. Mexico presents a strong need of trade diversification. The key issue in Chile has
been the effective alignment of port private operators interests in benefit of the nation, through
EMPORCHI administration, which will have the same importance in the Mexican case.
3.3.2.2 THE UNITED KINGDOM PORT PRIVATIZATION5 7
A similar privatization approach to the one that is carried out in Mexico was implemented
in the UK. The transport sector was at the forefront of the privatization program and since 1979
the administration of ports suffered radical changes:
* Deregulation designed to remove the obstacles to market forces and trade actvities at the
ports.
* Divestiture of the National Port Council in 1984
* Removal of investment and other statutory controls in 1984
* Modifications to the port labor law and removal to restrictive employement regulations in
1989
The former administrative structure was complicated since several companies provided
services under port authority jurisdiction (British Waterways Board, British Railways board,
British Transport Dock Board and local governments). Activities included maintenance, pilotage,
towage, berthing and cargo handling operations. As opposed to the case of Mexico and Chile,
57 See: B.J. Thomas "Privatization of the U.K. Seaports" Maritime Policy and Management, Vol. 21 No. 2
1994, pp. 135-148 and Vickers and Yarrow "Privatization in Britain" 1988 Oxford University Press, pp. 31-33
centralization did not exist. During the decade of 1970, ports in the UK presented severe
financial problems due to excess capacity, increasing cost to replace capital assets and increasing
labor costs and premature obsolescence. This was aggravated by the intense competition and
declining level of demand in the late 70's. At the center of the problem was the lack of a national
policy of operation and finance, lack of institutional arrangements to balance demand and supply
and lack of power to order closure of obsolete facilities.
During 1980-1984 the shipping specialization and intermodal transportation growth put
under severe pressure the UK ports. As a response, a market force scheme was adopted by means
of state withdrawal of any port control and financial support for inefficent facilities. The British
Port Transport Dock Board's (BPTDB) shares were progressively sold to the Public in 1983-
1984. The BPTDB was reconstituted under the name of Associated British Ports (ABP). As in
the Mexican case, this is corporatization followed by privatization. In the UK, the ports managed
as individual entities and the existence of four controlling Boards allowed ports to compete
among themselves. This did not occur in Mexico, so the creation of APIs at each port targets this
objective. The ABP is controlled by Associated British Ports Holding which is dependent of a
Secretary of the government. In 1991, the UK ports act enabled the transfer of statutory port
undertakings to companies limited by shares. However, as in the case of the Mexican APIs, the
government agency has no power to direct the management of ABP. The changes in the
administrative structure of the UK seaports led to commercial operation of the system, labour
flexibility, reduced manning levels, increased responsiveness to customer needs, further
intensification of competition, and gains in market share and profitability. In the following 5
years these kinds of results in the Mexican port system will be perceived to the extent in which
each one learned how to position itself competitively. World experience shows that privatization
of strictly regulated port monopolies has often been more successful than the privatization of
oligopolistic and unregulated port enterprises, because strategies can be better defined. This was
the UK case. Domestic rivalry is an important fact for achieving competitive advantage 58, but the
lesson of the UK must be remembered in Mexico. Domestic competition must always be directed
to fullfilment of national objectives.
5s Porter, Michael E. "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" The Free Press, 1990 p. 71
CHAPTER 4 PORT OF VERACRUZ: PRIVATIZATION OF THE SPECIALIZED
CONTAINER TERMINAL
In order to go deeper in the study of the Mexican port privatization process, this chapter
presents the transference to the private sector of the specialized container terminal (TEC:
Terminal Especializada de Contenedores) at the port of Veracruz. This will permit better
assessment of how the program elements have been implemented. The bidding process,
contractual agreements, valuation of assets, financial aspects, risk assessment, and the of role of
the Mexican constructors and their strategic joint venture partners are discussed.
4.1 THE PORT OF VERACRUZ
4.1.2 BRIEF INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
This section describes the current and future planned physical environment in which the
concessionaire of the TEC will operate, since the conditions of the TEC's surrounding
operational environment, common port infrastructure, major works and intermodal linkages will
be critical for success. To upgrade the port of Veracruz's utilities and internal infrastructure is a
determinant factor if the operators' transactions are to be efficient, especially during peak
container transportation flow times. Users of container terminals are extremely sensitive to time
and reliability59.
59 Dowd and Leschire "Container Terminal Productivity: A Perspective" Maritime Policy and Management Vol.
17 No. 2, 1990; pp. 107-112
The port of Veracruz is located on the Mexican Gulf coast, being the most important port
of Mexico in the east. Its geographic location, zone of influence and distribution of terminals and
major maritime works are shown in figure 4.1 (source 60). In 1993, Veracruz handled 21% of the
total cargo moved by the commercial ports, placing second behind Lazaro Cardenas, on the
Pacific coast. However, Veracruz remains the most important sea gateway of Mexico due to its
strategic location with respect to the main consumption/production centers of the country.61 In
the same year, this port handled 28% of the transoceanic cargo of the Mexican port system.
Figure 4.2 presents the evolution of commercial cargo volume at the port (source, 60). The
infrastructure of Veracruz covers an area of 569.5 Ha, of which 367.8 are located inland. Total
length of wharves is 8000 m, 41% for transoceanic operations. The access channel has a length of
2.8 km and 15 m depth. Veracruz has 6 inner turning harbors with 12.5 m depth, and 23 wharves
of reinforced concrete. Nine of them are utilized to carry out commercial operations. There are 17
berthing positions. Veracruz's main maritime signalization system is integrated by 3 beacons and
23 positioning buoys. The different terminals existent in Veracruz handle general bulk cargo,
grain bulk, mineral bulk, molasses, vehicles, fluids and containers. From an economic activity
perspective, this is extremely beneficial for the zone of influence of the port. Existing
infrastructure has been underutilized and its potential must be fully exploited through the new
port management perspective. 62
Common port infrastructure development goals are established in the port master program, as
mentioned in the last chapter. The new model of institutional organization requires
6 ICA "Estudio de la Terminal Especializada de Contenedores de Veracruz" ICA, 1995
61 Administracion Portuaria Integral de Veracruz. Presentacion. APIVER 1995
62 Personal Interview, Dr. Ernst Frankel, MIT
FIGURE 4.1 PORT OF VERACRUZ: GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND ZONES
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the API of Veracruz to achieve these goals. It must continuously evaluate the program, in order
to detect whether changes should be proposed for the benefit of the strategy of the port
administration, coastal development or the economy of Veracruz's zone of influence. The master
program's objectives must be aimed to ensure basic, efficient infrastructure exploitation and port
performance. Investment in port common infrastructure and major works has a strategic
character, and a consolidating factor and support for the port's business units.
The API of Veracruz has decided to channel some of the resources raised from the
concessions to the construction of its infrastructure. The port of Veracruz has faced delays in
general infrastructure investment, strongly affecting its operational efficiency and profitability.
To keep the current position of Veracruz in the national port system, it is necessary to direct
resources in the short term to the rehabilitation and maintenance of the existing facilities. 63 In the
same way, land use patterns and urban reorganization are issues that must be progressively
redesigned in order to improve port accessibility and ease transportation exit.
Regarding this, the port of Veracruz Consulting Commission will play a key role.
Therefore, the API of Veracruz will have to implement an effective financial program, in order to
fulfill the objectives established in the development program and concession of the
administration title. Adequate basic port infrastructure also represents a strong factor to incentive
private investment and future development of infrastructure for services provision. It can be a
good indicator of the level of commitment of the API to achieve port's goals.
63 Administracion Portuaria Integral de Veracruz "Programa Maestro de Desarrollo", APIVER 1995; p. 100
To upgrade and develop these kind of infrastructure, involves federal government
participation (through credits, not grants) at the beginning. This will progressively decrease as the
port operations revenues increase, giving the API adequate financial soundness to spend in fixed
capital works.64
4.1.3 PORT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The Master development program of the port of Veracruz establishes the basic path that
API must follow to ensure an adequate performance of the port system. However, since the port
administration is directly dealing with the market environment, it must implement effective
strategic planning in order to allow further investment to be timely directed according to the
port's needs. Although the Master program's framework should be taken as an overall guide, the
API has to assess changes in the market environment, since economic instability is likely to
inhibit long term planning. Therefore, the API of Veracruz faces the challenge of matching its
resources and port vision with the external market changes, in order to fulfill user's needs,
towards real achievement of competitiveness 65. The API of Veracruz's core objective (in light of
the expected enhancement of competition among ports), is to keep Veracruz as the most
important port of the country, and Mexico City's market seagate. This is stated in the Master
Development Program. Complementary actions directed to solve current infrastructure problems
in Veracruz, are needed in order to support the achievement of the port mission.
64 Administracion Portuaria Integral de Veracruz "Programa Maestro de Desarrollo", APIVER 1995; p. 114
World Development Report 1994 "Infrastructure for Development" Oxford University Press 1994; p. 120
See Kotler, Philip "Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning and Control" Prentice Hall 1976; p. 63
Port services in Veracruz must be operationally and physically integrated with the new
cargo handling and transportation technologies. Intensive introduction of multimodal services is
a priority, since the most important operational transformation requirements in Veracruz are
related to containerized cargo flow. However, one important port strength is the variety of
specialized terminals and business units that the port offers to investment. Therefore, the high
quality infrastructure for bulk cargo handling (grains, minerals and fluids) should be maintained
and improved as it is transferred to the private sector, looking for business oriented management
and enhancement of operational efficiency. On the contrary, Veracruz also has obsolete service
systems, which obstruct port operations and rely on transportation methods inconsistent with
overall needs.66 In the same way, it is necessary to increase storing space to take full advantage of
the port's loading and unloading capacity. As will be discussed in the next section, inland cargo
transportation O/D Veracruz has been favored by the construction of high specification roads.
Besides this, the Mexican railroad system current privatization has as one of the main objectives
to be a strong competitor with roads in serving ports.6 7 Therefore, in order to take full advantage
of these complementary infrastructure actions, the capacity and transportation efficiency of the
transition segments between the port and inland systems has to be improved. This will reduce the
possibility of traffic bottlenecks at peak hours, which has also been a damaging factor for the
port's overall efficiency. Port facilities expansion in the future should not be obstructed by
disordered urban development. The wharves need to be expanded according to the expected
growth in operations motivated by the introduction of commercial management, and their usage
should be redesigned to fit the new land use patterns resulting of the transference of services. The
66 Administracion Portuaria Integral de Veracruz "Programa Maestro de Desarrollo", APIVER 1995; p. 667 Cargo Systems, December 1995; Intermodal Section
port of Veracruz Operations Committee should make the adequate assessment and
recommendations.
As can be noted, strong investment is needed in the short and medium terms in order to
maintain the strategic position of Veracruz in the national port system. Solutions to the issues
mentioned above are indispensable for the future development of the port and represent a strong
incentive for investors to continue participating in the privatization process. This is the only way
in which progressive expansion of activities in the port will take place. The main strength of the
port is that the existing infrastructure for services has wide potential for being exploited to full
capacity.
4.1.4 INTERMODAL LINKAGES68
Veracruz is connected to the north, center and southeast of the country by road and
railroad systems. However, while containers can be transported by world class road
infrastructure, the railroad routes linking Veracruz need to be upgraded in the short term to
permit cost reduction in container unit transportation. This will only occur if the railroad routes
are able to compete effectively with roads. The average road and rail distances, and container
transportation costs from Veracruz to Mexico City during the 1st half of 1994 were the
following:
Average distance Cost USD (1st semester of 1994)
68 See: ICA "Estudio de la Terminal Especializada de Contenedores de Veracruz" ICA, 1995; p. 22-23
Road 424 km 780
Railroad 418 km 725
Three railroad routes link Veracruz with inland territory. All have a capacity of 120 lb. /
yd. Route 2 has currently the best conditions for container transport, due to its double stack
capacity:
Route 1.-Veracruz - Jalapa - Texcoco - Los Reyes - Mexico D.F. (To the center)
Route 2.-Veracruz - Cordoba - Orizaba - Puebla - D.F. (To the center)
Route 3.-Veracruz - Tierra Blanca - Coatzacoalcos (To the southeast)
Cargo O/D Veracruz can be transported by three toll roads with four lanes each:
1.-Veracruz - Cardel (To the north)
2.-Veracruz - Cordoba - Orizaba - Puebla - Mexico D.F. (To the center)
3.-Veracruz - Minatitlan - Coatzacoalcos (To the Southeast)
The high quality road linkages of Veracruz and the current transference of the railroad routes to
the private sector, will enhance container transportation flow efficiency between Veracruz and
the largest market in the country: Mexico city, with 22 million inhabitants. The scale of
concentration of Mexico city population and manufacturing favors long-haul rail moves over
road transportation, so both systems in competition will lead to cost optimization and pursuance
of high quality services. 69 These are issues that the TEC concessionaire or operator has to market
to attract shipping liners. The quality of road infrastructure has prepared the ground for the
operator to exploit to the fullest extent the container terminal of Veracruz. The operator, through
the concession has to take advantage of this. Since the railroad routes are undergoing fast
69 Cargo Systems, December 1995; Intermodal Section
restructuring in management and technology towards profitable operations and competitive edge,
the concessionaire of the terminal has strong incentives and support from inland transportation to
improve TEC's operations.
4.2 THE SPECIALIZED CONTAINER TERMINAL OF VERACRUZ (TEC)
4.2.1 TEC'S INFRASTRUCTURE 70
The TEC of Veracruz, concessioned to the private sector, is located at the North of the
port of Veracruz. Its area is limited at the west by Veracruz's shipyard and at the east by the fluid
cargo and grain terminals. Terminal layout and characteristics are presented in figure 4.3 (source
70). Operation of the TEC began in 1981, and the cargo evolution has registered an annual growth
of 29% in the 1990-1994 period, reaching throughput of 250000 TEUs in the last year. The
terminal will have a 507 m wharf, of which 339 are currently used for container handling. The
remaining 168 m are being reinforced for container operations, and the grain and molasses
terminals will be relocated allowing for storage area expansion. The wharf has two berthing
positions, width of 21 m, height of 2.4 m and design depth of 12 m. It should be noted that the
entire wharf length will be dredged in May of 1996, according to the Master Program. The
container storaging yard has an area of 213704 sq.m. In addition, the terminal has two power
stations of 7100 and 3500 KV and a diesel storaging tank with capacity of 15 tons. Regarding
major equipment, two Takraf wharf cranes of 30.5 tons, purchased in 1979 and two Bardella-
Mitsubishi cranes with capacity of 40.6 tons perform loading and unloading operations.
Automated logistics and information systems are to be implemented by the concessionaire.
70 ICA "Estudio de la Terminal Especializada de Contenedores de Veracruz" ICA, 1995; p. 4-59
Upgrading of the terminal's intermodal connections is strongly needed. (the capacity of the rail
adjacent to the TEC should be improved to double stack).
The need to increase container throughput at the port of Veracuz close to TEC operating
capacity is critical, since each container box destined to Mexico that is handled out of the
country, represents a loss of approximately 1000 USD.71 Only then, new terminal construction on
the Mexican Gulf coast will be feasible. New developments should be constructed out of urban
zones to allow terminals capacity growth to be less constrained.
4.3 TRANSFERENCE OF CONTAINER SERVICES TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
On February 27th, 1995, the federal agency Puertos Mexicanos and the APIs of Veracruz,
Lazaro Cardenas, Manzanillo and Altamira, called for international concession bidding on the
operation and management of the container terminals at their ports. The concession period was
determined to have a duration of 20 years, and the bidding included the purchase of existing
container handling equipment. 72 The concessions on container services are not exclusively
granted. In case new terminals are constructed, different operators can supply the market at the
same port. Revenues of the concessionaire/operator will be a product of container
loading/unloading, consolidation/deconsolidation, storing and inland shipment operations. The
71 Personal Interview, Dr Ernst Frankel, MIT
72 API Veracruz, API Altamira, API Lazaro Cardenas, API Manzanillo, "Concurso Internacional para la
concesion de terminales especializadas de contenedores y usos multiples", Febrero 1995

characteristics of the concessioned container terminal and the purchased equipment by the
concessionaire were already portrayed. The sequence of the bidding process was the following:
* Prequalification of participants
* Selling of bidding bases
* Payment of seriousness guarantee
* Submission of proposals
* Evaluation of technical proposals
* Opening of financial proposals
* Awarding decision
* Delivery of facilities and equipment
Although the capital structure of the concessionaire can be entirely constituted by foreign
investment, it must be formed as a company under the Mexican law.73 This is demanded by the
port law to avoid intergovernmental dispute resolution. In order to ensure bidders technical,
operational, managerial and financial capacity, prequalification documents were to be submitted,
including capital structure and all financial information of the participant corporations. In
addition, the proposers should sustain by means of official documents that they had the capacity
to operate and manage a container terminal with throughput of at least 100 000 TEUs. This was
the common ground to evaluate the technical proposals.
73Bidding Prequalification Documents; APIVER
After being prequalified, bidders submitted both, technical and financial proposals to the
API of Veracruz. Assessment and evaluation of the technical proposals preceded opening and
evaluation of the financial ones. Therefore, the API of Veracruz performed in first place a
comparative and rather qualitative and subjective analysis of the technical proposals considering
the extent to which the prequalification information, besides business and operational plans of
the concessionaire ensured best value and quality to the provision of container services. Labor
relations and technology transfer issues were also evaluated. Factibility of these plans were
determined by the API of Veracruz's decision committee. It also assessed the level in which the
technical proposals were consistent with price competitiveness policy. Evaluation criteria for the
technical proposals in order of importance was the following:
1.Corporate and financial profile of the proposer (Or partners)
1.1 Corporate status of the proposer - reputation
1.2 Capital structure
1.3 Current financial soundness and capacity
1.4 International experience in container operations
2. Capacity (management, operations, technology)
2.1 Capacity in the operation of similar container terminals
2.2 Experience in ocean systems management and maritime transportation
2.3 Current international contracts
3 Provosed business olan
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
Quality of the objectives established by the proposer
Feasibility of the projections cargo volume/price
Potential to attract clients and increase volume of cargo handled
Financial expected results
Commercialization goals
General consistency of the business plan
4 Terminal operations program
4.1 Investment and proposed improvements
4.2 Operational schemes proposed
4.3 Capacity to provide multi-user services
5 Labor relations plan and technology transfer
Labor conditions proposed
Scheme for human resources development
Mechanisms for technology and know how transference
5.1
5.2
5.3
All the established by the participant in the technical proposal, including committed
improvements and investments acquired contractual character in case of being awarded the
concession. Financial proposals had priority over technical proposals, since they are a better
indicator of the level of commitment of the proposer. However, technical proposal evaluation
could define the winner in case of financial offer tie (Difference of 3%). Evaluation criteria for
financial proposals was the net present value of the different payments due to the API of
Veracruz over 20 years of concession7 4:
* Fixed lease payment to the API (Monthly, to be inflation adjusted)
* Variable payment to the API depending on the number of TEUs handled (As more TEUs are
handled, payment decreases)
* In addition, upfront payment of concession rights and purchase of equipment, taking as base
APIs valuation of assets (Wharf and yard container cranes, were valued 16 000 000 USD).
The API of Veracruz received technical proposals submitted by 4 international consortia.
After their analysis and evaluation, the financial proposals were opened. The financial proposal
of the joint venture between Mexican company Ingenieros Civiles Asociados (ICA) and
Philippine International Container Terminal Services Incorporated won the concession for
operation and management of the TEC of Veracruz. Financial offers of the proposers were the
following (NPV 20 years):
Mexican Pesos (Millions)
ICA/ICTSI 531.24
Transportacion Maritima Mexicana/ 513.16
74 ICA "The Bidding Process", ICA 1995
Stevedoring Services of America
Sudamericana de Agencias Maritimas (Chile) 222.82
Tribasa (Mexico)/ P&O Containers (Australia) 153.48
The figures shown were offered as NPV of monthly fixed payment to the API during the
20 years concession period. In addition ICA/ICTSI paid in August of 1995, 17 million USD for
equipment purchasing and 15 million USD for concession rights. It can be seen that the
international bidding involved only transference of services provision using existing
infrastructure. Therefore, the ground for competition was well defined for the all the proposers,
mainly based on the financial proposal and monetary commitments in the technical proposals.
Eventual implementation of tariff regulation on container operation can severely affect the
operator's financial considerations, since payments to the API can not suffer any kind of
modification. One month before privatization the tariff applied to complete operation
(loading/unloading, delivery yard/vessel or vessel/intermodal vehicle) was 140 USD per box.75
Tariff can be monthly actualized according to inflation changes. The competitive environment in
which a port operates has an important impact on tariff design. Competition arises between ports,
extended to international maritime trade, and this competition is not only cost focused.
Reliability and efficiency are both important components of cargo handling, so there exists a
transaction between cost focus and premium value. From my point of view, tariff strategy is
integrated by two parts. The competition for transit cargo, for example in the case of containers,
which require frequent adjustments in tariffs.
75 ICA "Estudio de la Terminal Especializada de Contenedores de Veracruz" ICA, 1995; p. 23
4.4 STRUCTURE OF THE OPERATOR
The ICA/ICTSI joint venture was constituted as a corporate company enacted under the
Mexican laws76 (ICAVE). It will start operations with assets base of 30 million of new pesos.
Shareholding and franchise structure is shown in figure 4.4. Strategic decision making will be
performed by ICAVE's board of directors, which is also in charge of ordering implementation of
actions on operations. During all this process, the board of directors will interact with the
directions of operations, finance and management. Complementation of capacities drove
consolidation of this strategic joint venture. The experience of ICTSI in port development
accounts 70 years in the Philippines.77 The company's relationship with liners, maritime
organizations and commercial agents, besides its high technological expertise will facilitate
ICAVE's response to the TEC user needs. Through its operations and management, ICTSI has
transformed Manila International Container Terminal in one of the top 5 terminals of Asia.
Recently ICTSI was awarded a 18 year concession on the O&M of the terminal NO. 5 at Puerto
Nuevo, Argentina. ICA is the largest construction company in Mexico and Latin America.
Among its business, ICA includes industrial construction and manufacturing of heavy equipment
and operation of mineral cargo terminals. During recent years, ICA has fully entered into
developing financial schemes for infrastructure development, and it has financed large scale
projects both in Mexico and Latin America.7 8 Its expertise in industrial equipment manufacturing
and financial strategy in developing countries are valuable skills added to ICAVE. ICA's
projection of throughput, considering three business scenarios is shown in table 4.1.
76 ICA/ICTSI Joint venture agreement
7 ICTSI Annual Report 1994
7 ICA Annual Report 1994
4.4.1 CONCESSIONAIRE PROGRAMMED INVESTMENTS
ICAVE has developed an investment plan in order to improve operations at the terminal,
including the implementation of a computerized system (cosmos) for their control. The core
concepts included in the plan are the following79:
* Modernization of the existing cranes and major complementary yard equipment
* Redesign of the storing yard
* Restructuration of the 168 m wharf segment to be incorporated to container services
* Progressive purchasing of high technology equipment, which will be motivated by demand
increases. Acquisition of a new 40.6 ton crane with its complementary support equipment is
considered in the year 2000 if the actual throughput corresponds at least to the 1/2 scenario
forecasts. Equipment maintenance and insurance spending programs were included
* Regarding civil works, new offices, a maintenance yard and warehouse will be constructed.
Existing structures will be modified in order to increase the storing capacity for refrigerated
containers.
79 ICA/ICTSI Technical proposal
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CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS OF THE MEXICAN PORT PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
AND STRATEGIES FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
5.1 PROPOSED STRATEGY TO ATTRACT PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Infrastructure projects in Mexico are subject to laws that define rules for investment,
operation, and tariff implementation. In the broader scope, the regulatory framework is composed
by the following federal laws:80
* Federal Constitution of the Mexican United States.
* The Law for Foreign Investment, which defines the share percentages permitted to private
investors to access.
* The Law of Public Works, which controls specifications for construction and infrastructure
equipment.
* Federal laws which specifically address each infrastructure system. In the case of the port
system, the port law.
An adequate strategy should involve four concepts. The first one is the recognition of
government as no longer the only responsible agent of port infrastructure development. This is
strongly linked to modification of the port law. The law should be aimed to give Mexican
investors total access to invest in infrastructure and facilitate the access of foreign capital.8 ' In
addition, the law should be adapted in such a way that it could be compatible with national
so SCT "Oportunidades de Inversion en Infraestructura Basica en Mexico" SCT 1993, p. 65
81 SCT "Oportunidades de Inversion en Infraestructura Basica en Mexico" SCT 1993, p. 11
economic conditions and already implemented market liberalization. Clear definition of rules and
responsibilities will offer security and stability to the participants in privatizing ports.
The second important issue is a shift in implementation perspective. The first undertaking
in port privatization is to define what is to be transferred. Technological change followed by
world port systems is aligned with the unbundling approach 82, since increasing specialization of
operations is required. However, special attention requires the interaction among the various
parties involved in specific projects, in order to provide the stability needed by long term
investments. Lack of coordination among relative interdependent port business units can impose
high transaction costs. We can see that in the port case, where boundaries among services are
difficult to differentiate, more flexible regulation and coordination among interested parties can
make transfer of services more effective. This will be a task of the Port Operations Committee.
Ports should be unbundled or separated in their basic business units according to the following:
* Identify the units or areas that represent highest profitability
* Structure them in order to get better return on investment, making them attractive to private
investors.
* Attract participants according to their core specialties In this way, technological, operative,
and financial risks can be more efficiently managed, and the value of services increased.
The government has to invest directly and participate only in infrastructure development whose
level of fixed capital represents no possibility for private investors to profit83 .
82 World Development Report 1994 "Infrastructure for Development" Oxford University Press 1994; p. 52
83 World Development Report 1994 "Infrastructure for Development" Oxford University Press 1994; p. 120
The third element of the strategy is adequate privatization financing. Private sector
promotion of new financial schemes must be a priority. Port infrastructure privatization requires
high levels of long term investments. Adequate mechanisms that clearly define the financial role
of each participant, whether national or foreign, must be designed. Mechanisms should ensure
project pay off according to the expected cash flow and minimize financial risk through
diversification. Use of different national and international financing instruments is encouraged.
The number of shareholders of Port Administrations will progressively increase if effective
financial management is performed.
The fourth issue is selection of privatization technique. The actual strength of capital
markets will determine whether certain privatization methods can be applied84. The potential
participants will be sensitive to this and they will determine the feasibility of the project under
the limitations and constraints of the financial market.
5.2 PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM STRENGTHS
The achievement of port privatization objectives related to institutional change, implies
creation of incentives to improve performance. The business approach brought by the private
sector and its involvement in port financing, management and operations will give a commercial
orientation to port infrastructure exploitation. The introduction of liberalization in the Mexican
port system is to enhance competition to supply the market. Open bidding to supply this market
" Vuylsteke, Charles "Techniques of Privatization of State Owned Enterprises" World Bank Publications, 1988;
p. 4
will lead to efficiency enhancement and improvements at every stage of infrastructure
development, from planning to operations. A benefit from change is the opportunity to allocate
public resources formerly directed to subsidize port operations to high national priority
undertakings. The Mexican port privatization program shows creativity in its design and has
particular strengths, which can address in an effective way the basic concerns of the port system
in Mexico. The strengths are listed as follows, and they provide support for the national port
institutional model.
* Redefinition of the role of the Mexican government in port activities. The government will
retire its participation in port administration, operation of infrastructure, and provision of
services. Regarding Infrastructure development, the government will no longer have direct
intervention in construction of facilities for services. However, its role concerning major
works will be variable. The role of the government in port infrastructure operations becomes
strictly constrained, but it keeps as director of the national interest.
* Decentralization of port administration. Each port will have its own administration (API,
Administracion Portuaria Integral, constituted by law), to which the legal framework grants
managerial independence from the federal government. In this way, accountability and
financial self sufficiency will be unavoidably pursued. Decentralization will cut with
managerial vices by means of establishing independent port administrations, therefore
isolating port infrastructure form noncommercial pressures and constraints. This is the first
step in retiring government control in port administration control towards progressive
privatized APIs. or port administration this constitutes a base for future design of port tariff
structures to ensure cost recovery, profitability and demand driven services.
* Participation of the private sector not only in construction and operation of infrastructure and
provision of services but also in the administration of ports. This is to yield accountability.
Private participation in port authorities will ensure efficient and full transference of port
activities provision and competitiveness' enhancement. Mexican ports will be run under
commercial rules, leading to the establishment of clear and specific goals by the APIs and the
federal government.
* Creation of mechanisms aimed to ensure rational development of the port and to facilitate the
relationships among participants in port activities. In recently privatized ports the benefits in
terms of improved productivity and efficiency are difficult to identify. Therefore, adequate
monitoring by the Operations Committee and Port Consulting commission and coordination
will ensure responsiveness to customer needs at the beginning of the process. Adequate
performance of these organizational devices at this stage, can provide flexibility and a base
for future port profitability. In addition, whatever government concerns are on controlling
areas such as safety or environmental protection, they must be imposed in such a way to
affect the operations, economics and competitiveness of the privatized enterprise as little as
possible, if at all. The Operations Committee and the Port Consulting Commission will help
to attain this goal.
* Interaction of private port administration with the new federal agency is an excellent
advantage to introduce expertise in the benefit of the national interest. The main fact is that
the political commitment to reform is present. Public sector's new role needs to be
implemented and constantly improved, since it undoubtedly will be a requirement for
sustaining port productivity and efficiency. The role of the Government in Maritime
infrastructure changes from merely coordinating to interactive. Therefore, effective
alignment of individual port objectives is to be pursued and interest of special parties will not
damage the potential benefits of the restructuration.
5.3 PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM WEAKNESSES AND THREATS
5.3.1 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS
To the same extent that the Mexican port privatization program considers solutions for
improving the port industry by taking into account the particular characteristics and problems of
the system, its success can be threatened by several issues. They mainly correspond to political
aspects and potential economic factors altering the port business environment. Political factors
can threaten the very nature of the privatization program, since the port law allows eventual
introduction of tariff regulation and entry barriers. This is an area in which much bargaining will
occur among the government, APIs and operators. Restricting some corporations from competing
will cause strains in the economy by promoting a protected port system.85 Constrained
85 Hemming and Mansoor "Privatization and Public Enterprises" International Monetary Fund 1988; p. 12
privatization without adequate deregulation to run the terminals as independent businesses causes
inconsistencies that lead to conflicts and subsequent failure. The only accomplishment of such a
policy will be to reduce the willingness for private sector participation and delays in reaping the
program expected benefits. As the government seeks commitments from purchasers as to the
future financial and economic behavior of the ports, investors must seek stable and sure
commitments from the government so that they can operate their business satisfactorily.
To implement tariff regulation or entry barriers are factors against logic privatization and
competition policies. To do this will damage the market discipline. 86 The new port law is not
defending an uncontroversial and straightforward selling to the private sector. The whole
privatization program can be defeated and its feasibility and success endangered if the legality of
the transactions can be questioned retroactively. If market discipline and efficiency are respected,
monopolies will keep prices close to costs due to the threat of entry of new participants. I
consider that franchising and leasing mechanisms offer this possibility.
The macroeconomic environment for doing business will be critical to success. The main
threat to the plans of future privatization of services and infrastructure and the already awarded
concessions, is the macroeconomic environment of Mexico. Macroeconomic fluctuations are
always reflected in the capital markets87. Mexican economic recovery will not be immediate, and
the privatization of the port system will be progressive, so debt - led privatization would induce
strong hazards for the less capitalized proposers. In the same way, these fluctuations can damage
86 Hemming and Mansoor "Privatization and Public Enterprises" International Monetary Fund 1988; p. 14-15
87 Hachette, Dominique "Privatization in Chile: an economic appraisal" ICS press, 193; p 99-106 and 164-165
the financial strength of concessionaires and consequently their ability to cover the economic
obligations established in the concession agreement. Those participants relying on foreign capital
who are not members of a joint venture with a foreign company face the risk of currency
devaluation. This can be a source of operational risk, considering equipment. However, the
present free flotation of the peso exchange makes easier to detect currency movements. Inflation
figures greater than the ones considered by the worst business scenarios can damage the costs of
production and consequently the demand for port services. The privatization program specifies
that the private sector will absorb all risks.88 An additional problem is that Mexican financial
institutions do not currently have the capacity to ensure provision of long term resources.
89Contrary to the desirable, port developers facing contingencies will have to use foreign sources
of capital.
Policy on foreign investment also plays a main role. One purpose is to strengthen the
capacity and expertise of the domestic private sector. Learning potential should be assessed when
national corporations form joint ventures with foreign investors. In addition, difficult economic
conditions require foreign direct investment as a resource for privatization. We can see this in the
participation in joint ventures of firms such as P&O containers of Australia, International
Container Terminal Services Incorporated of Philippines and National Stevedoring of America
with national companies. In addition, involvement of foreign buyers is a factor for enhancing
competition and quality of the proposals. It seems that although all the risks and potential
privatization obstacles are to be borne and overcome by the private sector, their control is an
88 ICA "Privatizacion de Puertos", ICA 1995
89 SCT "Oportunidades de Inversion en Infraestructura Basica en Mexico" SCT 1993, p. 29
undertaking of the federal government. The government must take responsibility to provide an
adequate business environment in order to ensure the soundness of the process and the
fulfillment of port privatization objectives.
5.3.2 LABOR ASPECTS
Privatization of port services in Mexico will be accompanied by strong effects on
employment. 90 Excessive overmanning at terminals can cause rationalization of workforce as
direct result of privatization to acquire higher proportions.91 Therefore, a decline of employment
in the short term can be expected. However, the logic ground of this problem must be examined
in order to avoid damaging the desired improvement in operations efficiency and productivity
while respecting the social value of labor. The complexity involved has a strong effect on the
potential application of port cutting edge technologies. It is difficult to assess the market value of
the reduction in the number of people employed in order to determine the extent to which the
expected financial flows of the private investor would be reduced in case of retaining them.
Social policies are difficult to be imposed to the private sector investing in port infrastructure,
due to the fact that financial and trade liberalization demand significant changes in productivity.
For port enterprises, it will be more difficult to raise equity capital if excess employment issues
are not solved.
90 Personal Interview, Dr. Ernst Frankel, MIT
91 Cargo Systems, December 1995 "Automation"
Measures to lessen adverse consequences on employees, which can be a base for a labor
rationalization strategy can be the following:
* Special payments or packages offered to employees retiring voluntarily.
* Negotiated selection commitments with labor unions.
* Adjustments of levels of payment against pension guarantees.
The first two mechanisms are the most suitable to be implemented in the case of port
privatization in Mexico although the third one may be very helpful to ease relationships.
However, the positive impacts on employment caused by improved productivity in
terminals should be considered. Employment levels will grow as greater efficiency and improved
services attract more traffic and private investors enter in new businesses. Same trends will be
observed as new capacity for terminals is needed. Privatized ports in Mexico will interact with
inland terminals, road feeder services, packaging and warehousing. These complements to port
activities will offer better quality, productive and better paid jobs than those lost. In addition, the
skills levels of workforce will be improved.
5.4 CONSTRUCTION OF PORT INFRASTRUCTURE UNDER PRIVATIZATION
5.4.1 THE QUADRANT ANALYSIS MODEL
According to the established in the Master Development Program and Port law,
construction of two kinds of port infrastructure are analyzed: Port infrastructure for provision of
services and Common port infrastructure and major maritime works. The quadrant analysis
model is useful to determine the kind of strategy in which infrastructure is developed by locating
the transference of services and infrastructure procurement methods in a graphic framework. 92
Two axes are used to describe the government's fundamental strategies of infrastructure
development. The vertical axis indicates the strategic way in which funds for development are
provided either in a direct way from the government or in an indirect way, by involving the
private sector to accomplish government goals. The horizontal axis indicates the level of
integration of planning, design, construction, operation, maintenance and finance in the
procurement process. If these stages are separated, the procurement process is considered
segmented. Otherwise, the strategy is considered to have a system approach. (The procurement
array is shown in figure 5.1, source 93).
It must be noted that in Mexico port infrastructure construction and provision of services
was carried out by the government in a direct way, prior to implementation of the privatization
program. Construction of port infrastructure relied in federal funds and port services and
operation were heavily subsidized. Construction were contracted to private companies based in
lowest cost criteria. Although design and construction were integrated activities performed by the
E/C firms (government provided schematic design) operation and maintenance were carried out
by government personnel. As a result of this policy, In Mexico former port infrastructure
development in Mexico was located exclusively in Quadrant IV, as it is presented in figure 5.2.
9 2 John B. Miller "Aligning Infrastructure Development Strategy to Meet Current Public Needs" Doctoral
Dissertation, 1995 MIT; p. 21
" John B. Miller "Aligning Infrastructure Development Strategy to Meet Current Public Needs" Doctoral
Dissertation, 1995 MIT; p. 22
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5.4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND MAJOR
WORKS
APIs funds will be destined to the following undertakings, regarding construction of port
infrastructure other than for provision of services: 94
* Construction of infrastructure in common zones of the ports, for example, access roads,
disassembly, demolition or improvement of facilities.
* Construction of major strategic works in partnership with the federal government, if
necessary, in order to allow overall port goals to be reached. For example breakwalls, land
refills or construction of utilities.
* General maintenance investments needed at common zones of ports.
* Cover the APIs' own expenses and their financial obligations with the federal government.
Funding for these infrastructure construction will depend on the revenues collected from
concessionaires. In the design of this strategy I find creativity in aligning the contributions of the
different concessionaires in the benefit of the whole port development. However, also
government participation through credits will be needed in the construction of major works due
to their high cost and fixed capital characteristics. Government loans will progressively decrease,
as the market of the ports grows as a result of improved efficiency and productivity. At this
point, the APIs will be in financial position to develop major works. The mix of public credits
and private investment, being the latter the main source for infrastructure development, shifts
4 Administracion Portuaria Integral de Veracruz "Programa Maestro de Desarrollo" APIVER 1995; pp. 100-120
port infrastructure strategic development in Mexico from direct to indirect. Regarding integration
level, attractiveness to operate and maintain these kind of infrastructure is high for port utilities
and low for sea major works. In developing the projects, APIs should submit schematic designs
according to the port needs (defined in the port master development), providing common ground
for competition. In doing this, APIS will extend competition over of the project. Systematic
project procurement will yield to the APIs better project value, through unified risks and
incentives. Therefore, development of infrastructure other than for services provision in Mexican
ports, is located in the model in Quadrant II, as is presented in figure 5.3. The strategy will be
located farther or closer to the horizontal axis to the extent in which government financial
intervention is needed to complete the works. In this case, government resources must be
consciously committed and used only if indispensable.
5.4.3 DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE PORT INFRASTRUCTURE UNDER
PRIVATIZATION
When provision of services are consolidated at the Mexican ports, and the strategic
planning of the APIs at port level and of CGP at national level determine the need for expanding
terminals, indirect-system infrastructure development schemes must be implemented.
Competition for the design, construction and operation of terminals, under Build-Operate-
Transfer approach should be opened. Equipment for operations will be owned by the operator.
Implementation of BOT is supported by unbundling of port activities. It enhances definition of
responsibilities and risk allocation, besides the inherent benefits of adequate privatization.
System based infrastructure development for Mexican ports will permit to structure competition,
ultimately adding value to the project in timing, capital costs, operation and maintenance costs,
Figure 5.3
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and performance. In base to the discussed in former sections of this chapter, it is evident the
alignment of this kind of procurement method with the strategies for solving the problematic of
the Mexican port industry. See figure 5.4. The incentives implied in indirect - system methods
will provide strong support for the success of ports strategic actions.
5.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE SPECIALIZED CONTAINER
TERMINAL AT VERACRUZ
5.5.1 THE BIDDING PROCESS AND RISK ASSESSMENT
The bidding process presented an outstanding characteristic in the establishment of the
financial offer as a single and understandable criteria to define the winner. In addition, the
decreasing variable payment to the API dependent on annual container throughput represents an
effective incentive for the concessionaire to improve performance on operations at the terminal.
However, the process involves critical issues form which several risks emerged. The strong
differences among the financial offers show the difficulty of doing long term planning and
forecasting under instable economic conditions. It is no possible to apply statistical methods
because of the following:
* Mexican economy has been recently open to free international trade.
* The growth tendency of container operations was extremely fast during the years of economic
stability, condition likely to change in light of the severe recession.
* Fast technological change in shipping and maritime transportation.
* New management approach in port operations.
It can be extremely difficult to define a reliable revenue stream and to establish a logic
rate of return. In this case, the level of expertise and experience in doing container business in
developing countries, besides deep knowledge of the economic transitions in Mexico and
political environment were key to prepare not only a profitable but even rational financial offer.
The API did not guarantee minimum container throughput.95 Since this is a business based on
operations, the concessionaire bears all risks. Analysis of future throughput should consider
different financial scenarios, since the financial offers for the Specialized Container Terminal of
Veracruz were determined in terms of revenue potential. In forecasting demand, both of the
following conditions had to be considered:
* Competitive market values for services provided or demand in a freely competitive market
* Cost of providing services again under competitive conditions affected by facts such negative
economic trends or unexpected reductions in international traffic.
These can be used to determine the value of the port assets to be privatized or the amount
that the private investor would need to invest to obtain the expected net future flows. The
variability in existence and access to capital markets, and financing instruments, also affect the
cost of privatization financing and increase the complexity of defining a financial proposal.
95 ICA "Privatizacion de Puertos", ICA 1995
Risks besides financial can be identified in the character of the concession as non
exclusive. This issue exposes the contractor of the TEC to face competition for the same market
at the same port. The master development program of the port of Veracruz considers construction
of a new container terminal, and at this point, the capacity of the TEC would have reached its
limits. In case that the TEC operator loses the bidding for the development of the new terminal,
its business would be seriously threatened by the new competitors, who will have access to new
infrastructure, better equipment and technology. Regarding Environmental risks, the operator of
the TEC is considered fully responsible of all environmental damage caused by its operations. In
addition, the ability of the national commission of competitiveness to raise port tariff regulation
also represents a threat to the private investor. Intervention of the commission of competitiveness
in the case of Mexico can damage the needed flexibility in tariff adjustments, placing the TEC of
Veracruz in a disadvantageous position with respect to their regional competitors. This issue can
also be a result of political decisions, out of the context of managing the container terminal as a
business.
5.5.2 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION SCENARIO AND PORT OF VERACRUZ
REQUIREMENTS
Outstanding growth of container shipping, strongly motivated by World trade
diversification, demands from port managers constant enhancement to their terminals.
Construction plans to handle containers in the North American region aim to soar handling
capacity, through new terminals development. Authorities of Ports currently constituted as mega
hubs are not willing to lose their positions (For example Seattle-Tacoma, Long Beach, Houston),
since competitors plan in some cases to double their container handling capacity (As it is doing
Vancouver port Authority). Canadian and US ports need high levels of investment directed to
new construction and purchase of new equipment.96 In the case of the port of Veracruz,
investments are to be firstly directed to upgrade existing infrastructure and modernize operations
and equipment. Considering construction of common port infrastructure and major maritime
works, the quadrant II "flexible" strategy is convenient for existing port upgrading, since
government resources are recognized insufficient to correct infrastructure weaknesses. Regarding
the horizontal axis, the delivering approach is recommended to be design - build. Full advantage
must be taken of the port administrative openness to package projects through effective
competitive processes, enhancing best value and optimal project cost and timing.
Container infrastructure in Mexican ports should be utilized to its full potential, before
terminals expansion is considered. The operations at the TEC of Veracruz are to be restructured
with this purpose, through privatization. It must be taken into account that this process should be
hastily carried out in order to allow Veracruz's container capacity to grow, supported by sound
and rational basis. Optimal utilization of infrastructure should be achieved as soon as possible in
order to boost services expansion and new terminals construction. Otherwise, the port container
capacity will not be able to catch up with the development of its regional competitors: South
Atlantic U.S. ports. Therefore private management should perform a fast transition from
consolidation of finance and management to sustainable strategic actions towards gaining
competitive advantage. Only constant enhancement of operational performance and technological
improvement within a framework of aggressive business and investment strategies will enable
concessionaires to divert existing transoceanic traffic to the existing ports in Mexico.
96 Cargo Systems, February 1996 Ports and Terminals section
5.5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONTAINER OPERATIONS AT THE TERMINAL
The following recommendations on management aim to boost productivity of operations
by considering the container terminal as a dynamic system. Although the concessionaire
investment plan seems aggressive according to the aforementioned risks and established financial
liabilities to the API, the concessionaire should always take into account that the container
terminal is a system integrated by both, sea and land components. 97 The TEC is a physical link
between maritime and inland modes of transportation. This system presents interaction dynamics
among, several enterprises: ICAVE, API, liners, rail operators, and truckers, and each party could
affect operational productivity. ICAVE should perform strong control of the linkages of the
system's value chain. Besides this, improvements in one segment of the system should not lead
to the creation of operational bottlenecks in others. Only in this way, the concessionaire will
reduce the cost per container maximizing profit per unit. A complicated issue, is that the judged
performance of the operator strongly depends on the behavior of certain variables out of its
control, which were already discussed, such macroeconomic and regulatory threats. As the
operator is receiving existing facilities, it is to adeptly deal with possibly existing productivity
constrains that might be progressively perceived. Constraints to optimum operations could be
imposed by shape and layout of the terminal, amount and type of equipment available, and the
type and characteristics of the vessels using the terminals. For example, Veracruz will be unable
to serve post panamax container vessels, until a new package of wharf cranes is acquired or
constructed by one of the joint venture parties. Therefore, the operator is compelled to constantly
97 Weinstein, David "A design suggestion for a futuristic container terminal" Thesis, M.S. MIT 1994; p. 16
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assess the system's balance and productivity limiting factors. In the same way, the concessionaire
must clearly define priorities if it is to maximize profitability and provide maximum value to the
TEC's users.
5.6 TOWARDS A NEW ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT
Undoubtedly the Mexican government will be playing a key but transformed role as privatization
progresses. Although directly financed by the government, infrastructure projects in Mexico are
almost always constructed by private companies. Besides the BOT roads program, the other
infrastructure systems are likely to initiate privatization through operation and management
concessions. The complete infrastructure privatization approach, including construction,
operation and transfer will be implemented as markets are gained and the needs of infrastructure
expansion emerge. Therefore, the main shift in the role of the government will be related to the
operation and provision of services. 98 It will need to redefine its involvement, which must be
focused on the following aspects:
5.6.1 GOVERNMENT AS OWNER OF INFRASTRUCTURE
The government must ensure that those who are not direct users of the system receive
benefits (National positive impacts). The improvement of the infrastructure operation through
privatization should yield benefits to the users of the system, which pay for doing so, but society
98 Walker Charles and Smith A.J. "Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate Transfer approach", ASCE
publications 1995; pp 14-15
also must be benefited.99 Over and above the cost for which providers are paid directly, there are
costs of pollution or environmental degradation that are endured by society. The government
should pay special attention to equity issues, the extent to which the costs and benefits fall on
different groups of society. It must always be reminded that although correct valuation of social
costs and benefits is difficult, it is extremely important, in case compensation to some group
affected by the private sector infrastructure operation is needed.
The Mexican government has failed to assume its role as infrastructure owner by allocating to
itself sovereign risks, the product of political pressures that damaged society as a whole. Politics
and infrastructure must be separated.
5.6.2 GOVERNMENT AS REGULATOR AND SUPPORTER OF TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE
I discussed above the importance of adequate government regulation in the strategy
necessary for attracting private investors and creating an adequate environment for privatization
to have success. To the extent that regulation gives access to foreign technology and investment,
economies of scale will be altered and the risk of monopoly reduced.'00 The government as a
regulator must ensure that where competition is feasible it is promoted and where economies of
scale exist, providers operate efficiently and respond to demand requirements. Regarding this
item. However, if the government is to make economic changes sustainable, they have to be
supported by technological change. Regulatory design plays a key role if this is to be achieved.
99 Walker Charles and Smith A.J. "Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate Transfer approach", ASCE
publications 1995; p 234
10o Hemming and Mansoor "Privatization and Public Enterprises" International Monetary Fund 1988; pp. 14-15
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The government is to create an adequate environment and mechanisms to foster concessionaires
innovation.
5.6.3 GOVERNMENT AS PROVIDER OF INVESTMENT SECURITY
The risks involved in long term operation of infrastructure can be very difficult to assess
and control. 10 1 Risks as described earlier in this section should not be accepted by the
government any longer. Rather, its role is to encourage correct assessment of the cost of project
finance and operations. 102 If some level of risk is to be absorbed by the government, it should be
minimized. Then, the government should charge a price that can compensate for its involvement,
rather than pour out its resources. The economic conditions of the country will play an important
role in these long term projects. They include risks such as changes in currency valuation and
competitive conditions. Competitive bidding can result in the awarding of contracts to bidders
who underestimate the risks and fail to systematically conceive the projects. The government
must carefully evaluate these issues and offer reliable information before transferring risks to the
private sector, but in no way should it absorb them, if society is not to be damaged. Management
of risks premiums or penalties is recommended. The Mexican government must oversee for the
national security by preserving necessary and indispensable rights through contractual terms, in
order to ensure reasonable access to the facilities. The private operators and the government are
1o0 Walker Charles and Smith A.J. "Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate Transfer approach", ASCE
publications 1995; p 143
Tiong, Robert K.L. "BOT projects: risks and securities" Construction Management and Economics 1990, 8; p
315
102 Walker Charles and Smith A.J. "Privatized Infrastructure: the Build Operate Transfer approach", ASCE
publications 1995; pp. 236-237
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to define in the actual contracts their respective responsibilities, and to eliminate political
objectives to the greatest possible extent. Private promoters should carefully evaluate what the
nature of their relationship with the government will be when developing their proposals. Correct
assessment of the project's complexity will be key to the relationship's success.
5.7 PROPOSED STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND FRAMEWORK TOWARDS
COMPETITIVENESS
5.7.1 STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
The objectives of port privatization in Mexico go beyond reaching the benefits that
privatized infrastructure yields. I analyzed the objectives associated with the transference of port
infrastructure and services to the private sector, as a result of institutional change. However, the
port system privatization must pursue other kinds of goals, which can only be achieved through
the implementation of different strategies and complementary infrastructure support actions.
These goals target to give to Mexico a long term competitive position in the international
maritime trade, since global forces will direct enormous pressures over port systems worldwide.
Only those countries whose port systems are prepared to face that will succeed. This is strongly
linked to upgrade the Mexican port system according to the current technological maritime
advancements to attain the strongly needed trade diversification and interchange with other world
regions besides North America. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has
increased transportation competition of land based transportation modes, specially road, with
ocean transportation. 103
103 Hekila "NAFTA and Canadian Ports" Maritime Policy and Management, 1995 Vol. 22 No. 4; pp. 345-361
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Besides increasing product handling diversification, Mexican ports should become
strategic channels for introducing domestic products in the international market. Economies of
scale play an overwhelming role in port and shipping competition. 10 4 New port privatized
management and operation must be aligned with these tendencies by establishing stronger trade
linkages with other world economies and commercial blocks. Port management in Mexico
should direct interaction efforts to the Pacific Rim, which will conform the most important
commercial center during the next decades. Privatization of ports in Mexico has to overcome
single dependency tendencies by adding value to the activities provided by the them, serving as
global integrating points.
In addition, there exist a valuable potential to recover traffic O/D Mexico, currently
handled by North American Ports. The Port of Houston is sometimes considered as the main port
of Mexico. Containers from Europe are off loaded at this port and then trucked or railed across
the border to Mexico.'0 5 The new environment of Mexican port industry, specially regarding
container services, must be committed to eliminate through effective competition the niche that
US ports have carved on Mexican trades. According to the exposed in the former paragraphs, the
proposed strategic objectives of port privatization in Mexico are the following:
1. Strengthen the industrialization of the country and consolidate the Mexican maritime
infrastructure in order to cover the growing needs of maritime transportation originated by
the Mexican commercial opening.
04 Graham - Hughes "Containerization in the eigthies" Lloyd's of London 1985; p. 17
105 Container Management, December 1994; p. 27
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2. Increase the operative efficiency of the ports to world class levels, by creating a sustainable
maritime environment in Mexico and to develop competitive and equilibrated intermodal
transport in the country.
3. Achieve a competitive position in the most dynamic commercial center of the world: The
Pacific Rim.
4. Be selected as a maritime trade bridge between South America and the U.S.
5. Recover the traffic O/D to Mexico handled by the North American ports.
6. Intensify introduction of Mexican products in a potentially open Cuba.
Promote appropriate coastal development and a Maritime culture in Mexico.
Future port infrastructure development must be directed to fulfill these objectives.
Strategic support from infrastructure complementary actions and enhancement of intermodal
transportation through intensive cargo containerization will play a key role. These strategies,
once implemented in the four main ports of the country, Manzanillo, Lazaro Cardenas, Altamira
and Veracruz, should be used as a base for transferring competitiveness to the whole port system.
Port's business, management and human resources strategies must lead the shift in the Mexican
106
perspective of competitiveness: from abundance of natural resources to intensive technology
incorporation and intensive investment.
Privatization of the port system in Mexico represents a great opportunity to establish
productive work systems. In addition, the Mexican port industry through the implementation of
the proposed strategies will channelize the national industry to foreign markets, contrary to the
traditional domestic industry approach. Port privatization can be used as base for the creation of a
national port technology and development of domestic technical personnel. Specialization of
human resources and the creation of research institutions for the maritime industry will be key.
Achievement of port competitive advantage 10 6 in Mexico is to be reached only if the strategic
actions and the modified role of the government enable the national port industry to innovate in
port operations, technology, management, finance and construction. Figure 5.5 shows the
proposed strategic continuum towards real competitiveness in the Mexican port system.
5.7.2 STRATEGIC ACTIONS
5.7.2.1 INTERMODAL TRANSPORTATION AND CONTAINERIZATION
Competitive ports are technology transfer and innovation hubs. Containerization must be
assisted by advanced information technology systems, equipment and operation methods.
Therefore, focusing on containerized cargo operations is critical for port development in Mexico.
The technological delay has been enormous. A priority is to catch up with the international
106 Porter, Michael E. "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" Free Press 1990; p. 18
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changes, and private operators in Mexico must respond fiercely to containerization. The
container is superior in cargo protection, security and handling characteristics at the port or
inland transportation.' 0 7 This cargo handling advantages will get the Mexican ports moving out
of the traditional, technology and poor value added bulk cargo methods.
Increased containerized cargo in Mexican ports will lead to shorter cargo transit times,
handling of a large number of units and additional complexity in inland movements. All of these
require faster and more effective data control. Containerization brings the real potential for
Technological transformation of the port system in Mexico. Containerization impacts on the
different transportation modes are strongly needed in the country108. However, several
infrastructure support actions are needed in order to incorporate containerization benefits to the
overall transportation system and industry:
* Construction of intermodal centers and container distribution depots.
* Improvement in railroad and road Linkages between small ports in less developed zones.
* Upgrading and modernization of the railroad Infrastructure. The aim is to reduce containers
O/D transportation time and cost, between coasts, consumer centers-ports, north border-ports.
* Further deregulation in road cargo transportation.
107 Graham - Hughes "Containerization in the eigthies" Lloyd's of London 1985; pp. 17-19
108 See C.F. de Castro "The role of intermodal freigth terminals in transport network planning in developing
countries" Conference on ports, policy and practice, 1979 Cardiff UK. London Nautical Institute 1979; pp. 92-98
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FIGURE 5.5 Mexican Ports Strategic Framework: Towards Competitiveness
I Privatization program
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Containerization introduced by the ports to supply the world's largest concentrated
market, Mexico City, could boost the required demand in toll roads. With respect to the
transportation services O/D Mexico City, road transportation is the main mode due to the quality
of this system compared to railroad. The railroad system will require deep modifications to
assembly and operate container unit transport rails, due to the predominance of infrastructure and
machinery for operation and handling of bulk cargo: agriculture products, fluids and cement.
Containerization is the only way to improve technology of cargo transportation in Mexico,
according to international requirements.
5.7.2.2 PORT NEW MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
If higher goals and competitiveness in the Mexican port system are to be reached, the
functions performed by those who participate in port activities have to match the flow and
authority boundaries designed in the organizational model in order to avoid any kind of
inconsistencies. This is extremely important, because the APIs bear most of the responsibility of
improving the competition of Mexican ports in the North American region. APIs management
should be performed with expertise looking for technological development and optimum
linkages with other transportation modes. In this way, the market power of the ports will improve
progressively. 109 Concession of container terminals from the APIs to top enterprises through
adequate bidding will have the main effects on overall port competitiveness. Container Terminals
must be the most important element in Mexican port industry. The APIs should avoid negative
109 T.D. Heaver "The implications of increased competition in port policy and management" Maritime Policy and
Management, 1995 Vol. 22 No. 2; pp. 125-134
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interference of other port activities in their operations. APIs should design contracts with private
operators ensuring provision of value added services focusing on performance, heightening
competition among different port terminals.
The treatment of ports as part of the market system by their new management has
ramifications that can be addressed at two levels: The first level is that of national port policy:
before an overall national strategy is developed, terminals must learn to compete. Evolution of
more competitive long terminals in the medium term will lead to an increasing relevance on
public port policy to the channelize traffic among ports. At this point, implementation of an
effective national port strategy by the Coordinacion general de Puertos will be needed, aiming
even economic growth among zones. In addition, commercial management approach in port
infrastructure is to be reflected in a drastic decrease of social port policimaking. In the second
level, APIs management will be required to be innovative and responsible to the needs of
shippers and other transport organizations. The consequence is that the key political decisions
shift from federal to local levels in order to respond to changing market conditions. Port
managers will face the new challenges of operating in a new port policy regime.' 1 They have to
take advantage of the incentives present in this more competitive environment to show leadership
in the search for more efficient port operations. The best way to do this is to practice demanding
performance benchmarking"'.
110 T.D. Heaver "The implications of increased competition in port policy and management" Maritime Policy and
Management, 1995 Vol. 22 No. 2; pp. 125-134
"' Ashar "Comment" Maritime Policy and Management, 1995 Vol. 22 No. 4; p. 389
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5.7.2.3 BUSINESS-INVESTMENT STRATEGY FOR THE MEXICAN PORTS
With introduction of private management, business perspective will drastically shift and
port system in Mexico will have to define a clear mission, targeting to benefit national trade
competitiveness. Concessioned terminals must implement in the short term commercialization
and marketing actions, allowing them to be recognized by potential clients. The obtained
feedback must provide elements to implement actions to fulfill client's needs and to keep
performance standards. These efforts should be done at port individual level. Shipping liners
and commercial agents should become acquainted with the new port organization and improved
facilities. They also should be informed about development plans in the short, medium and long
terms, along with the technical expertise, experience and business objectives of the
concessionaires. They are to work in close interaction with the API in order to avoid to the
maximum extent operational problems which could damage terminals' image and affect port
users. A continuous operational monitoring should be performed in order to reduce any kind of
inefficiencies. Constant services renewal and actualization of information and cargo handling
technologies through intensive but well planned investments are key to attract clients. Port
performance benchmarking with respect to other competing ports in the region area will be
needed in order to ensure technological change to be motivated.
At the same time, as constant improvement of efficiency, productivity and profitability is
performed, concessionaires should ensure excellence in operations by means of continuous
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interchange of information and establishment of technology agreements with other ports and
terminals in South Asia and South America. Operators involved in the process will not have
other alternative than to incorporate cutting edge technology, improving their relationships with
transportation companies and industrial corporations. They must pursue recognition of their
business competitiveness and consequent share growth in traffic. Regarding markets to be
targeted, the Caribbean, Central America and South America represent the highest business
potential and attractiveness for the Mexican ports on the gulf coast.1 12 The base for establishing
them as priorities is that the trade potential with the US ports is practically defined. The internal
market also represents a great opportunity, and provision to middle sized companies can begin
with semispecialized services.
Investment needs can be defined according to two planned phases of redevelopment. The first
phase is aimed to consolidate operations of terminals. During this phase, investments are to be
allocated to the following:
* Upgrading of terminals infrastructure and fulfillment of port master program requirements.
* Rehabilitation or substitution of obsolete equipment.
After the phase of growth consolidation, the actions of the second phase should be intensive
capitalization and implementation of new technologies over the created base. Then, Investments
that should be performed to boost the competitiveness of the terminals are the following:
* Introduction of high performance methods of operation and logistics based on cutting edge
information technology.
112 Personal Interview, Dr. Ernst Frankel, MIT
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* Introduction of computer aided terminal planning and equipment maintenance.
* Establishment of adequate information technology linkages with terminals users and shipping
liners.
* Improvement on the level of handling security.
* Enhancement of commercialization and marketing actions.
5.7.2.4 HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
The new terminal operation methods and systems require careful assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of human resources. A key issue will be their adequate training and
indoctrination. Evaluation of workforce capacity should include previous experience and
operational skills in order to identify the training needs, according to the technical improvements
that the operator is to implement. In the same way, it is necessary to identify issues that represent
incentives or disincentives from the workers point of view.
Training programs should be timely planned and related and evaluated according to the
business development and budget plans. In order to ensure continuity in the level of effort
performed by the personnel, the employment conditions at the terminals have to be constantly
evaluated. Effective implementation of strategies goes hand by hand with skilled, responsible,
aggressive and professional workforce. This will be a key issue to manage if Mexican ports are to
achieve the level of competitiveness demanded by the international maritime activity.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS
1.- Three causes led to the detriment of port operations in Mexico.
Lack of equilibrium: Misconceptions on coastal development concentrated the industrial
growth in the central zone of the country, which progressively increased the difficulty and cost of
directing national production to international markets via ports. As a consequence, the process of
industrialization in Mexico has not been fully transmitted to the coastal zones. The development
of maritime technological, and managerial skills was hindered, adding complexity to the
problematic of uneven territorial development. The problems of uneven growth were enhanced as
the United States became Mexico's main trading partner and promoted the development of
inland transportation over sea transportation.
Centralization: Centralized port administration exposed the system to inconsistent
planning and policymaking which occured between government transitions. In addition, the
fragmentation of port authority among several federal agencies did not allow the establishment of
a strong and consistent national strategy. Under the protective approach, having the government
as owner and operator of the whole port system, individual ports in Mexico did not learn to
compete.
Subsidization: Government control of ports in Mexico ultimately weakened their
infrastructure and performance. Subsidies and protection severely damaged ports ability to
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evolve at the same rate than the international port industry. Subsidization eliminated incentives
for improvement, and damaged market discipline, accountability, and consolidation of
workforce. Non competitive ports have stunted Mexico to develop its full export potential, by
contributing to the country's economic instability.
2.- The privatization program represents a basic and temporary solution to the problems
of the system.
Port privatization in Mexico, taking into account institutional changes and transference of
services, provides a temporary solution to the problems. It is just to serve as a base for the
development of future sustainable competitiveness. Port privatization offers to improve
management, operations efficiency and productivity, and above all an opportunity to financially
consolidate the system, relieving government's public budget. These changes will cause
reduction in port costs which will be reflected by improved port revenues. Decentralization and
privatization of port administration will yield accountability and financial self sufficiency.
Interaction between private sector and government can be used as a mean of transferring
management expertise and extra momentum for port infrastructure development, adding quality
to the national strategy. Since the program is directed in its first stage to privatize existing
infrastructure, the operations and management learning gained in this phase will be an advantage
when expansion of port infrastructure becomes necessary. Considering construction of common
port infrastructure, the privatization design shows creativity in aligning revenues collected form
the different concessions benefitting whole port development. Overall government participation
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is to decrease. However, its rational involvement in construction financing may be neccessary in
cases where fixed capital works are required to sustain competitiveness. Consolidation and the
optimum use of existing infrastructure should be achieved in the shortest possible term, since
added capacity is required to catch up with international competitiveness standards. Government
priorities in Mexico are increasingly diffused and privatization of the port system is a useful
alternative to finance the urgently required port investments and improve productivity on
operations. However, the benefits resulting from well implemented privatization per se are not
sufficiently powerful to deal with the challenges of world's port industry.
3.- Technological change is the main challenge for the Mexican Ports.
Port Management of technological change will be the most important problem to be
addressed in the future of Mexico's port development. Technological change decisions, which
are determined by economic and financial issues, should be driven rather by the timing of
implementation pressures. The investments needed to upgrade the existing infrastructure in
Mexico should not be lost by permitting the improvements to become rapidly obsolete:
Technological progress in ports is not something to be left until the end of the economic life of
infrastructure and equipment. It must become the base for continuous and progressively less
expensive changes to be performed. Incentives to innovate and mechanisms to encourage the
creation of domestic maritime technologies must be initiated. They need to be able to match not
only international performance requirements but also national capital expenditure issues.
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4.- Mexico is well positioned to take advantage of the International trends in port industry.
Economies of scale in maritime transportation are playing an important role in port and
shipping competition. Cost competitiveness and high transportation reliability are determinant.
Due to the technology available, existence of a nearby city is not necessary for a modem port to
handle large tonnages of cargo. I believe that Mexico should take advantage of this: the
international trends request construction of Mega container terminals on the Pacific coast, thus
enhancing the importance of the role of the private sector and the indirect-system procurement of
port infrastructure construction. The key element in developing these kind of port and terminals
construction will be to optimize operations through international alliances and networks between
port operators in Mexico and shipping liners in order to ensure that Mexican ports will be
distribution and feeding cargo centers. I consider that a future requirement will be to increase the
role of negotiation in the bidding processes in port infrastructure development in Mexico. Since
bigger ships will only attend calls at Major ports, and from there containers will be distributed to
minor destinations, it is extremely important that the strategic actions implemented by
concessionaires reach full capacity of existing infrastructure. Terminals anticipating ships
technological requirements should be constructed. Regarding this, the space available for port
construction in Mexico represents an advantage to locate these meager hubs in zones out of urban
congestion.
5.- Port privatization objectives must go strategic, and strategic planning will make the
difference between success and failure.
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The macroeconomic environment, global market forces, international trade patterns and
the 21st century's sea transportation represent an enormous challenge: the privatization of ports
in Mexico should be aimed to gain competitive advantage. Only if it is achieved, will the value of
improvement be observed. Otherwise, the Mexican port system will remain obsolete and the risk
to return the system to government control will be high. Objectives in Mexico go beyond the
basic results of privatization, as it suggested in Chapter four. If these objectives are to be attained
by port management, the functions performed by those who participate in port activities should
be consistent with the flow and institutional boundaries designed. Port management will also be
in charge of seeking new and optimal links or partnerships with other industrial and
transportation sectors. The expected result is that the market value of ports in Mexico will
increase. Constant services renewal, performance benchmarking and actualization of information
and cargo handling technologies will be of strategic importance. Investments in upgrading
existing infrastructure should progressively change from intensive investment and outsourcing
and learning of updated technologies to national port industry innovation. The level in which
private port construction and operation direct efforts to create demand for port services, national
maritime technology and development of skilled human resources will be determinant to reduce
dependency on foreign companies to improve the performance of the Mexican port system and
gain competitive advantage.
Ports are in competition with one another, and the possibility to substitute one for another
is extremely high. I consider adept strategic planning to be a key factor, and it must be
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implemented by the private concessionaires and APIs. They will be in contact with the market,
trying to align its forces for their benefit. Better ports mean more efficient international transport
services, with more trading patterns, more exports and more imports. Changing international
maritime technology and trade involve uncertainty and diverse conditions that will impact
operational performance of ports in Mexico. Risks will emerge regarding technological and
financing, business and competition issues. It will be very important to evaluate alternative
strategies to define the actions able to maximize success. Strategic planning performed by the
different participants in the Mexican port industry is required to promptly identify opportunities,
threats, and their potential effects. In the same way, it will enhance port management discipline
in the country. In the short term, strategic planning will permit the establishment of various
actions to be performed, anticipating future developments. Port markets are very instable. Port
strategic objectives will be assessed in the long run in terms of continued improvement of market
share and competitive position within the region. Therefore, objectives of port privatization will
assume a dynamic character, permitting consideration of national and external factors:
competition, political and regulatory aspects, technological change, financial changes, human and
labor relations international relations, availability of resources, market changes, threats of entry
or exit, and organizational issues. To do this will permit asses and select the actions leading to
the achievement of the highest expected value. The next step will be continuous updating and
formation of programs. We Mexicans must strive to be directly benefited by port redevelopment
and structural change in our country. To make this a reality, we have to be first in efficiency,
responsibility and quality in port services.
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